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Abstract: The present work is on the analysis of carrier's responsibility legislation according to EU 
law in comparison with the rules of international law and the evolution of the jurisprudential 
orientation of the Court of justice of the European Union in air transport in the sector of carrier's 
liability, damages for non-fulfillment and delay, overbooking and, loss of baggage. What are the rules 
of responsibility? the basis of the requested compensation? are some of the elements of research and 
response through EU jurisprudence according to international legislation of recent years. 
Keywords: Aircraft liability; Reg. 285/2010; Montreal Convention of 1999; EU law; CJEU; psychic 
damage; delay 
 
1. From The Hague Protocol of 1955 to Montreal Convention of 1999 
and Regulation n. 285/2010 
The air carrier liability regime has been regulated, from 1929 to today, by a vast 
and substantial regulatory production, which undoubtedly focuses on two 
Conventions of Warsaw and Montreal, dated 1929 and 1999 respectively, but 
which finds further important references in a series of regulations which, from time 
to time, dealt with particular aspects of the legislation in question. The evolution of 
the uniform legal discipline of air transport, beyond the many unilateral ferment 
and various initiatives, went back in its essential lines to an era in which the 
phenomenon that was called to regulate was still going through its pioneering 
phase. 
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Even before the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Fearon, 1999, pp. 401ss), was 
reached, the basic lines of the discipline of damage for death and injury of 
passengers in air transport (Rodiere, 1990)-which represent it, due to the relevance 
of interests at stake and of resulting effects in terms of compensation obligations, a 
topic of extreme importance-have been traced, at European level, by EC 
Regulation n. 2027/97 of the Council of 9 October 1997 on the liability of the air 
carrier in the event of accidents involving damage to the passenger (Giorgetti, 
2012; Benyon, 2013, pp. 22ss)1. 
Subsequently, with the revision of EC Regulation n. 2027/97 (Giemulla, Schmid, 
1998, pp. 98 ss; Field, 2005, pp. 70ss; Gand, 1962, pp. 24ss; Lee, 2015, pp. 250ss. 
Havel, Sanchez, 2014, pp. 23ss; Leloudas, 2013)2 by EC Regulation n. 889/2002, a 
further regulatory evolution was implemented by a regime in which the uniform 
right-dictated by the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Grönfors, 1956, pp. 120ss), 
whose scope of application was limited only to “international” air transport 
(Soames, Goeteyn, Camesasca, 2004, pp. 115ss; Sanchez, Havel, 2014) as defined 
by art. 1 of the same Convention - alongside the internal law of single states, a very 
different system- “introduced” by provisions of the aforementioned EC Regulation 
n. 889/20023, which extends the application of uniform law provisions (and, 
specifically, those dictated by the Montreal Convention “with regard to the air 
transport of passengers and their baggage” to transports carried out in a single 
member state4. 
Wishing to briefly review international regulations on aeronautics that have 
                                                     
1Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in the event of 
accidents, OJ L 285, 17.10.1997, p. 1-3 . CJEU, C-301/08, I. Bogiatzi v. Deutscher Luftpool and 
others of 22 October 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:649, I-10185. The sentence was based on the Council 
Regulation of 9 October 1997, n. 2027 on the liability of the air carrier in the event of accidents in 
relation to the four additional Montreal protocols of 25 September 1975 and the art. 29 of the Warsaw 
Convention for liability of the air carrier. In the same of orientation also the case: C-258/16, Finnair 
of 13 April 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:252, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
2See, Williamson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 1945, 67 Cal. App. 2d 250, 153 P.2d 990; Webber v. 
Herkimer & M. St. R. Co., 1888, 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358; Herron v. Miller, 1923, 96 Okl. 59, 220 
P. 36; Baltimore City Passenger R. Co. v. Kemp, 1883, 61 Md 619. Turner v. Stallibrass, 1898, 1 Q.B. 
56; Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc., 1943, 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680; Ellis v. Taylor, 1931, 172 Ga. 
830, 159 S.E. 266; Quaker Worsted Mills Corp. v. Howard Trucking Corp., 1938, 131 Pa. Super. 1, 
198 A. 691. 
3Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 May 2002 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents (Text 
with EEA relevance) OJ L 140, 30.5.2002, p. 2-5. 
4The Montreal Convention concluded on 28 May 2009 was signed by the European Community on 9 
December 1999 and approved in its name by Council Decision 2001/509/EC of 5 April 2001. 
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occurred over time, it is noted that the 1929 Warsaw Convention was already the 
subject of an amendment, through a series of protocols that had alternate results: 
from the Hague Protocol of 28 September 1995, to the Guatemala City Protocol of 
8 March 1971, up to the four Montreal Protocols of 25 September 1975, including 
that of Guatemala City in 1971 and of Montreal no. 3 have never entered into 
force. The Warsaw Convention regime was then supplemented by a complementary 
Convention of Guadalajara of 1961 (Le Goff, 1963, pp. 20ss; Von Röhl, 1938) on 
air transport performed by a subject other than the contractual carrier, which, 
however, was not ratified by the United States of America. 
Apart from the aforementioned Protocols that have modified certain aspects of it, 
the 1929 Warsaw Convention is based on the regulation of documentation of the 
transport contract and on that of the vectorial liability for death and injuries 
suffered by the passenger, for damage or loss of goods and baggage delivered due 
to delay, providing, at least in its original text, the “billet du passage” for passenger 
transport, the “bullettin de bagages” for the transport of baggage and the “lettre de 
transport aérien” for transport of goods. The omitted or irregular issuance of such 
documents entailed the carrier's forfeiture of the benefit of the release document 
and the compensation limit for which the carrier could avail himself (Chassot, 
2012). 
The liability regime dictated by the Warsaw Convention focused on a principle of 
liability for fault of the carrier, who, “appealing” to the facts constituting the 
responsibility provided for by articles 17, 18, 19 of the same Convention, he was 
admitted to give the liberating evidence of having operated according to canons of 
good carrier, or of having taken all the necessary measures to avoid the damage, or, 
again, not to have been able to adopt them. With regard to the transport of goods, 
the Convention also provided for the possibility for the carrier to exempt itself 
from liability by providing proof that the damage was derived exclusively from 
“faute de pilotage, de conduite de l'Aeronef ou de navigation”, and this under the 
provision of art. 20, subparagraph 2, of the original Convention text1, subsequently 
repealed by art. X of the Hague Amendment Protocol of 1955 (Giemulla, Schmid, 
Mölls, 1992. Giemulla, Weber, 2011; Stephen Dempsey, Jakhu, 2016; Walulik, 
2016; Giemulla, Weber, 2011). 
                                                     
1See in particular from the CJEU the next cases: C-299/18, Neldner of 22 August 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:706; C-656/18, F. of 7 November 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:924, C-566/18, Austrian 
airlines of 11 January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:71: C-557/18, Eurowings of 8 November 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:950, all the cited cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
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With reference to the various types of damage covered by the Convention in 
articles 17, 18, 19, and art. 24 affirms the inviolability of limits and criteria of 
imputation of responsibility, regardless of the title on the basis of which the action 
was carried out, in order to prevent the injured-at least in legal systems that admit 
the accumulation of the action with that contractual- can obtain a result more 
favorable to him than that provided for by the Convention. 
The Hague Protocol dating back to 1955, although not distorting the general layout 
of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, adopted a different formulation of the cases of 
forfeiture of the benefit of the term, and furthermore doubled the limits for damage 
to people. With reference to the first aspect, he foresaw the impossibility of the 
carrier to avail itself of the benefit of the limit in the event that the documentation 
of the transport contract does not explicitly recall the applicability of the uniform 
law regime and limits provided therein; this clause was aimed at guaranteeing the 
user of the transport the effective knowledge of liability regime applicable to the 
transport itself, thus allowing him to make a declaration of value for goods and 
baggage and/or to protect himself with insurance instruments1. 
Moreover, with reference to the conduct of the carrier suitable to determine the 
forfeiture of the benefit of the limit, the Hague Protocol reformulated art. 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention, providing for the possibility that the compensation limits 
could be crossed if the damage had been caused: “d'un act ou d'une omission” of 
the carrier or its employees and persons in charge in the performance of their 
duties, committed with the will to cause harm or, in any case, with the awareness: 
“qu'un dommage en résultera probablement”. The recourse to this notion, however, 
has given rise to two different interpretations of the law; the one, objective, which 
considered the conduct of the carrier and the provost to be rash and aware that it 
diverged from a standard parameter of knowledge and conduct that was legitimate 
to expect from a diligent carrier and person in charge; the other, subjective, which 
required a reference to concrete and effective representation of the reality matured 
by the acting subject (carrier or person in charge) and which, evidently, imposed on 
the injured party a much heavier probative burden. 
                                                     
1Consider, moreover, that already in the validity of the unmodified text of the Warsaw Convention, 
the US jurisprudence had opportunely excluded-with orientation that, probably, making use of the 
“juridical categories” in force in our current normative panorama, was inspired by the concept of 
“Unfair terms” -the applicability of these limits in cases where the transport conditions were referred 
to in the ticket in such small characters as to be unintelligible; this interpretative solution was then 
endorsed also by other jurisdictions, even if some US jurisprudence of the nineties has “backtracked” 
on the point. 
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Article. XIV of the Protocol in question also introduced an art. 25 A of the Warsaw 
Convention, which aimed to expressly extend the limits and exemptions of 
responsibility in favor of the employees and supervisors who had acted in the 
exercise of their functions, and therefore in the absence of conduct aimed at 
causing damage, or in any case “stained” by the knowledge that damage could 
result from them; in fact, in the absence of such an incident, the employees and 
persons in charge of the maritime carrier of goods could not avail themselves of the 
same exceptions and limitations as the carrier could use. 
A significant source of novelty was made to the text of the Warsaw Convention by 
the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, which extended to the “de facto carrier”, for 
the route taken from it, the regulation of vectorial liability, allowing this carrier to 
make use of limitations and causes of exemption from liability provided for in the 
Warsaw Convention. 
With the Guadalajara Convention, as mentioned, the vectorial liability regime 
introduced by the Warsaw Convention has been extended to the de facto carrier, of 
course for the route taken from it, and, in any case, without prejudice to the “joint” 
responsibility of the contractual carrier for deeds and omissions of the de facto 
carrier and its supervisors1. 
In essence, the passive legitimization of the vectorial liability actions exercised by 
the user damaged by air transport must be identified, alternatively or cumulatively 
depending on the choice made by the plaintiff, both for the contractual carrier and 
actual carrier. This is prima facie an element of significant novelty and relevance in 
the regulatory landscape of international transport, only considering that the 
Guadalajara Convention was the first uniform text to give the transport user the 
right to act, at its own discretion, both towards the contractual and de facto carrier; 
                                                     
1The Guadalajara Convention found a sufficient number of accessions and ratifications to guarantee 
its entry into force; however, it was not ratified by the United States of America, whose common law 
regulatory system, based on juridical principles completely different from those in force in continental 
legislation, required a clarification in terms of identifying the carrier subject to the provisions of the 
Convention of Warsaw. And in fact, precisely because of the different legal characterization of 
common law systems compared to civil law systems, the fact that the Warsaw Convention did not 
provide a notion of “transporteur” posed problems of interpretation also in relation to the nature of the 
action for damages. suffered by the passenger, and the consequent passive legitimization of such 
action, in the event that the transport was performed by a subject other than the contractual entity. The 
“quid iuris” stood in relation to the different way of conceiving the action against the carrier in 
continental law systems-in which it is understood as a contractual action, with the consequent 
affirmation of the passive legitimacy of the subject who is required to perform the contract the 
transport-in comparison to those of common law, in which the legitimacy. 
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on closer inspection, however, the innovative scope of the principle of extending 
liability to the de facto carrier introduced by the Guadalajara Convention could be - 
at least for legal systems that admit action by the injured against carrier's préposés - 
less substantial than it can appear at a first examination, considering that the carrier 
in fact may well be qualified as preposè of the contractual carrier and that, 
moreover, the carrier to which the 1929 Warsaw Convention refers appears to be 
what is called “transporteur contractuel”1 art. 1, lett. b, of Guadalajara Convention2. 
And in fact, since the carrier replies, in any case, of the facts of its préposés, it is 
necessary to consider that these, in turn, can benefit from the same limitations as 
the carrier might use, and this due to the provision introduced in art. 25 A of the 
Warsaw Convention from the Hague Protocol of 1955. 
The system introduced by the Warsaw Convention began to “falter” during the 
1960s, when the high uniformity of the legislation governing international air 
transport gradually deteriorated. This “ferment” probably finds its origin in the 
American “denunciation” of the Warsaw Convention dating back to 1965, 
motivated by the deemed need to raise compensation limits in the event of death or 
damage to the safety of passengers, and subsequently withdrawn by the United 
States only following the Montreal Agreement of 13.5.1966, signed between the 
airlines operating in the United States and the Civil Aeronautical Board. This 
agreement (Milde, 1989; Mendelsohn, 1967, pp. 497ss; Cheng, 2017, pp. 671ss)3 
constituted the starting point of a series of interventions implemented on 
compensation limits with unilateral initiatives, especially from those socially and 
economically more advanced states, in which the protection of primary values such 
as life and safety of passengers was felt as a priority. On the contrary, the Protocols 
of amendment of the Warsaw Convention aimed at bringing significant innovative 
ideas to the compensatory discipline dictated by the Warsaw Convention found 
                                                     
1Defined, under letter c of the art. I, “transporteur de fait”, that is, a subject that is also different from 
the contractual carrier who, on behalf of this, has fully or partially assumed the execution of 
international air transport. 
2This was the first uniform text that expressly provided the user with the possibility to take action 
against whoever actually performed the contractual obligation, or part of it, and in spite of the fact 
that in principle no prohibition could be traced for the person who is obliged to transfer people or 
things, to replace others in the performance of the service. The regulatory gap could lead to 
considerable disparities in treatment for both passengers and carriers: if in civil law systems the action 
tends to be conceived on the contractual level, with consequent passive legitimation of the subject 
contractually required to execute the obligation, in common law systems we move towards a tort 
action perspective, to be addressed against the person who has physically carried out the transport. 
3classified from the author as: “a private agreement on a particular interpretation of the Warsaw 
Convention”. 
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little success with ratifications and accessions. 
Incidentally, it seems interesting to recall, with reference to the national context, 
that the Constitutional Court, with the sentence n. 132 of 1985, declared the 
constitutional illegitimacy of the provisions that had introduced the Warsaw 
Convention and the Hague Protocol into our regulatory system, since the 
compensation limits provided for by these uniform legal texts for the damage 
caused by the carriers to the person of passengers were considered inadequate with 
respect to goods of primary and constitutional status such as life and health, and 
also because of the fact that, in any case, no guarantees were offered in terms of 
certainty of compensation. Following this ruling, therefore, Italy called itself 
outside the regime of application of the Warsaw Convention, to which it was 
subjected again after the approval of law n. 274, 1988, whose art. 2 reintroduced 
the possibility for the air carrier of persons to avail themselves of the compensation 
limit. 
As mentioned above, the problem of raising compensation limits was felt with 
greater urgency and priority in the most economically advanced countries, which 
attributed less importance to that, closely connected to it, of the proportional 
increase in insurance costs for carriers, and the consequent effects on tariffs from 
the same applied for the air transports1. In any case, even the most “defensive” 
                                                     
1 In the Community context, the definitive consecration of the “need to guarantee a minimum 
adequate insurance level to cover the liability of air carriers in relation to passengers, baggage, goods 
and third parties” aimed at a more incisive consumer protection has been sanctioned by the adoption 
by the European Parliament and Council of the EC Regulation n. 785/2004 with which, in recital 24, 
the greater efficacy of a wide-ranging synergic action was explicitly recognized, highlighting that 
“since the objectives of this Regulation, namely the establishment of minimum insurance 
requirements that can contribute to the achieving the objectives of the internal air transport market by 
reducing distortions of competition, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States and can 
therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community can intervene on the basis of the 
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty (…) “. See also from the CJEU: C-487/12, 
Vueling Airlines SA v. Instituto Galego de Consumo de la Xunta de Galicia of 18 September 2014, 
published in the electronic reports of the cases. We also take into consideration the general 
conclusions of Advocate General Y. Bot of 23 January 2014 concerning the sentence just mentioned 
where he stated that: “(...) that freedom with regard to tariffs does not apply to the tariffs applicable to 
the charges air services that are part of a public service obligation, and this in accordance with Article 
22, paragraph 1 of Regulation n. 1008/2008. This freedom does not apply even to the levies imposed 
by public authorities or airport managers, that is to say with regard to taxes, airport fees and 
supplements connected to safety or fuels, which, due to their nature, cannot be included in the free 
assessment of economic operators and that the EU legislator specifically and separately contemplates 
article 23, paragraph 1 of Regulation n. 1008/2008 (...) the legislator of the Union does not limit itself 
to taking into consideration: “(...) the price (...) that passengers must pay (...) for their own transport 
(...)”. In fact, it explicitly refers to the prices linked to “remuneration (of the agency) and other 
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positions of compensation limits have cracked in the face of unilateral initiatives of 
individual carriers, which have constituted the most direct precedent of the 
interview agreements with which most of the airlines participating in the 
International Air Transport Association have renounced to make use of the 
limitations and, in part, also of the causes of exemption of responsibility provided 
for by the “Warsaw system”. 
The Agreement of 1966 was followed by the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on 
Passenger Liability stipulated in 1995 in Kuala Lumpur and implemented with the 
IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement -MIA 
of 1 February 1996, and subsequently the ATA Provisions Implementing the IATA 
Intercarrier Agreement to be included in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs-IPA of 
16 May 1996 (Clarke, Yates, 2016; Clarke, 2013; Bäckdėn, 2019). 
What is certain is that the aforementioned unilateral initiatives of carriers have 
urged the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to reconsider the 
parameters of liability of the air carrier of persons, also in consideration of the fact 
that, as regards goods sector, in 1975, after a phase of absolute stasis in the 
situation of ratifications to the Warsaw Convention, the conditions had been created 
for the entry into force of the IV Montreal Protocol, which introduced significant 
changes both with reference to the documentation of transport, both with reference 
to the liability regime of the carrier. This Protocol was also ratified by the United 
States, which, however, also wished to change the criteria set by the Warsaw 
Convention in matters of jurisdiction, proposing that the four forums provided for 
by art. 28 was accompanied by an additional one linked to passenger's state of 
residence. 
                                                                                                                                       
auxiliary services”, which therefore goes well beyond the costs directly linked to the execution of air 
transport in the strict sense. In this regard, I do not believe that the notion of “auxiliary services”, 
according to Article 2, point 18, of Regulation n. 1008/2008 it is necessary to connect the services 
proposed by the agencies (...) the legislator of the Union through the establishment of “common 
norms for the provision of air services in the Community” in accordance with the title of Regulation 
n. 1008/2008. Indeed, from recitals 2, 5 and 18 of this Regulation it is clear that the latter is intended 
to develop a more efficient, more uniform and more homogeneous application of the Union 
legislation for the internal aviation market, in such a way as to avoid distortions of competition 
deriving from the different application of the rules at national level, on the one hand, and allow 
consumers to be able to effectively compare prices for air services, and on the other (...) Article 22, 
paragraph 1 of Regulation (EC) n. 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
September 2008, laying down common rules for the provision of air services in the Community, must 
be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the 
which prohibits air carriers from charging, as an optional price (...), the registration of the passenger's 
baggage (...) “. 
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Even in the face of the innovative momentum that was maturing within the 
I.C.A.O., the process of revising the “Warsaw system” (Mercer, 2003, pp. 147ss) 
was slow to produce concrete results, probably due to the problematic nature of 
identifying solutions on which all states concerned agreed. 
The difficulty in giving birth to an organic revision of the Warsaw Convention led 
the European Council to adopt the EC Regulation n. 2027/97, aimed at regulating 
the liability of the air carrier in the event of accidents causing damage to 
passengers by passengers (Whalen, 2000, pp. 25ss. Jarvis, Straubel, 1994-1995, pp. 
911ss.; Lyck, Dornic, 1997, pp. 20ss. Goldhirsch, 2004, pp. 275ss; Cobbs, 1999, 
pp. 123ss. Sisk, 1990, pp. 127ss; Desbiens, 1992, pp. 164ss. Goldhirsch, 2004, pp. 
275ss. Bok Kim, 2001, pp. 289ss; De Gama, 2017)1, and inspired by the pre-
                                                     
1See, ex multis from the international jurisprudence: Olympic Airways v. Zacopoulos, Court of 
Appeals of Athens, January 21, 1974; Franklin Mint v. TWA, US Court of Appeals (2nd Circ.) 
September 28, 1982; TWA v. Franklin Mint, US Supreme Court, April 17, 1984, Air Law, Vol. 
IX,1984. In case: Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd, King’s Bench Division 23 October 1935; Court of 
Appeals 13 July 1936, which is observed that:: “(...) all reasonable skill and care in taking all 
necessary measures to avoid damage (...)”. In case: Hannover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 14 Avi. 
17.710 (A.D. N.Y. 1977), the court has declared that: “(...) all necessary measures really meant all 
reasonable measures (...)”. In case: Chrisholm v. British European airways, 1. Lloyd’s Rep. 626, 
Manchester Assisez, 1963, which is affirmed that: “(...) the passengers had been instructed to take 
their seats and fasten their seat belts because of air turbulence (...) it was sufficient that the air carrier 
proved that he had taken all reasonable care in warning the passengers, and thus the passenger’s claim 
was denied (...)”. See also in argument the next cases: Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc, 1965, A.Ct.., 
341 F. 2D 851, 2d Cir. 1965; Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 1965, A.Ct., 352 F. 2D 494; Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 1966 A.Ct., 370 F. 2D 508; Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 1989, 490 U.S. 
122, 109 S.Ct. 1676. In the same spirit see also: American Airlines v. Ulen, 1949, A.Ct., 186 F. 2d 
529, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 307; Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, 1999, A. Ct., 177 F. 3d 1272; 1999 
A.M. C. 2286; Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 947; Republic Nat. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232, 
239, 2d Cir. 1987. M. MILDE, Warsaw Requiem or Unfinished symphony?, in The Aviation 
Quarterly, 1996, pp. 40ss. DeMarines v. KLM, 1978, A.Ct., 580 F.2d 1193; Air France v. Saks, 1985, 
470 U.S. 392, 105 S.Ct. 1338, which is affirmed that: “(...) on what causes can be considered 
accidents and did not suggest that only one event could be the accident (...) any in jury is the product 
of a chain of causes (...) some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the 
passenger (...) The issue we must decide is whether the “accident” condition precedent to air carrier 
liability under Article 17 is satisfied when the carrier s unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a 
passenger is a link in a chain of causation resulting in a passenger s pre-existing medical condition 
being aggravated by exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin (...)”. See also: Herman v. 
Trans World Airlines, 1972, 12 Avi. 17, 634, 1972, and 12 Avi. 17, 304; Husserl v. Swiss Air 
Transport Company, 1975, D.Ct.,388 F. Supp. 1238; Evangelinos v. TWA, 1977, A. Ct., 550 F.2d 152; 
Day v. TWA, 1975, A.Ct., 528 F.2d 31; Day v. TWA, 1975, A.Ct.; Air-Inter v. Sage Et A.l., Cour 
d’Appel de Lyon France, Feb. 10, 1976; Schoner’s case law digest Air Law, Vol. II (1977), p. 229; 
MacDonald v. Air Canada, 1971, A.Ct., 439 F.2d 1402, which is affirmed that: “(...) find that in not 
advising passenger of the risk they assume, an airline may be negligent, but this negligence is not in 
itself an accident within the meaning of Article 17 in the sense that the D VT sustained by the plaintif! 
is not linked ta an unusual and unexpected event external ta him as a passenger (...)”. Moses v. Air 
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Afrique, 2000, D.Ct., 2000 WL 306853, E.D.N.Y.; Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. 1984, A.Ct., 
739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984, no. 83-57750); Dias v. Transbrasil Airlines, inc. 26 Avi., CCH, 16,048, 
S.D. N.Y. 13 October 1998; El Al Israel Airlines, Ldt. V. Tseng, 1999, S.Ct., 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 
662. Gal v. Northern Mountain Helicopters Inc., Dkt. No. 3491834918, 1998 B.C.T.C. Lexis 1351, 
British Columbia; Emery Air Freight Corp. V. Nerine Nurseries Ltd., 1997, 3 N.Z.L.R. 723, 735-736, 
New Zealand Court of Appeal; Seagate Technology Int’l v. Changi Int’l Airport Servs. Pte Ltd., 1997, 
3 S.L.R. 1,9 (Singapore Court of Appeal); Craig v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 1994, 45 F.3dd 
435 (9th Circ. 1994); Capacchione v. Quantas Airways, 1996, 25 Avi. CCH, 17,346, C.D. Cal. 1996; 
Segurian v. Northwest Airlines (1982), 86 A.D.2d 658, 446 N.Y.S.2d 397, 2d Dep’t, aff’d, 57 N.Y.2d 
767, 454 N.Y.S.2d 991, 440 N.E.2d 1339; Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 1997, 119 F.3d 1515; 
Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947 JFK, 1992 WL 170679, S.D.N.Y. 7 July 1992, 23 Avi 
18,465; Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945, 1990 WL 127590, E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 28, 1990; Tsevas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 97 C 0320, 1997 WL 767278, N.D. III. 1 December 
1997; Wallace v. Korean Air, 1999, D.Ct., 1999 WL 187213, S.D.N.Y.; Wallace v. Korean Air, 2000, 
A.Ct., 214 F.3d 293; Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 1974, N.Y.A.Ct., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 
848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97. See also: Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, 1997, A.Ct., 151 F.3d 108; 
Alvarez v. American Airlines (2000) D.Ct., 2000 WL 145746, S.D.N.Y..Air France v. Saks 470 U.S. 
392 (1985); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 2004, which is stated that: “(...) When we 
interpret a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories considerable weight (...) It is 
reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty 
constantly (...) Maintaining a coherent international body of treaty law requires us to give deference to 
the legal rules our treaty partners adopt. ft is not enough to avoid inconsistent decisions on factually 
identical cases (...)”. El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 u.s. 155, 1999; Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 
524 u.s. 116; Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217, 1996; Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 
530, 1991; Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 u.s. 122, 1988; Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Cor 
p., 466 u.s. 243, 1984; Demarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F2d 1193 (3rd Cir. 1978), the 
court has accepted that the incidence “(...) must be an unusual or unexpected event or happening (...)”, 
as we can see in the case: Abramson v. Japan Airlines 739 F2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1984), the court has 
concluded that: “(...) the occurrence that allegedly aggravated plaintiff's condition was not an 
“accident” within the terms of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention (...) The “accident” requirement 
of Article 17 is distinct from the defenses in Article 20(1), bath because it is located in a separate 
article and because if involves an inquiry into the nature of the event which caused the in jury rather 
than the care taken by the airline ta avert the injury (...) the question of wh ether a pre-existing 
infirmity aggravated by unusual, abnormal and unexpected flight operations would constitute an 
Article 17 accident even though if concluded that a pre-existing condition or sensitivity of the 
passenger aggravated by “usual, normal, and expected (...) usual, normal, and expected flight 
operations also left open a question with which subsequent courts have struggled-whether an accident 
can be deemed to exist when the in jury has nothing to do with flight or travel activity (...)”. We 
continue with the next cases: Lonngadinos v. American Airlines. Inc” 199 E 3d68, 70-71(1 st 
Cir.2000); Gezzi v. British Airways, 991 E2d 603,604(9th Cir.1993); Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
1997 WL 767278 (N.D. III. Dec. 1, 1997); Stone v. Continental Airlines. Inc., 905 E Supp. 823 (D. 
Hawaii 1995); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 Esupp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y.I994); Price v. British 
Airways, 1992 WL 170679 at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992); Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2od 
Ciro 2000) (Wallace); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 E Supp. 280,283 (S.D.N.Y.1994); 
Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago (BWIA Int'l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945, 1990 WL 127590 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990), which the Court has defined that: “(...) accident occurred here even under 
the narrower characteristic risk of air travel approach (...) she was cramped into a confined into a 
confidential space beside two men she did not know, one of whom turned out to be a sexual predator. 
The lights were turned down and the sexual predator was left unsupervised in the dark. ft was then 
that the attack occurred. In the Wallace Case, described the way that an air carrier could avoid the 
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eminent need to redefine the insufficient limitation of liability of the 1929 
Convention, as amended by that of the Hague of 1955. 
Returning to the Community regime, we can say that in the premises of Regulation 
2027/1997 EU Council pointed out that: “(...) the maximum limit of liability set by 
the Warsaw Convention is too low compared to the current economic and social 
conditions and often leads to lengthy legal disputes that damage the image of air 
transport (...) “, and that for a long time had developed the profound need” for a 
complete review and revision of the Warsaw Convention” through a community 
action inspired by the principle of subsidiarity1. 
First of all, it is underlined that Regulation 2027/1997 was applied - except for 
voluntary submission - only to EU carriers, and was intended to regulate 
exclusively the liability regime for personal injuries, while transportation remained 
outside its scope of goods, as well as, as regards transport of persons, responsibility 
for loss or damage of baggage for damages due to delay and non-fulfillment. 
With the Regulation in question, therefore, a series of supplementary provisions of 
the Warsaw Convention were introduced which provided, first of all, that 
Community air carrier responsibility: “for damages from death, injuries or any 
other personal injury suffered by a passenger in in the event of an incident”2 was 
not subject to any financial limit, whether from a legislative or a contractual 
                                                                                                                                       
liability interestingly (...) the standard (...) of the Second Circuit will impose liability for damage 
sustained in Warsaw Convention transportation unless the air carrier segregates passenger according 
to gender (same sex assaults remain problematic), seat female passengers in aisle seats only, hire 
sufficient cabin crew to be able to provide constant surveillance, eliminate closing of window shades 
during in-flight movies and fly with the interior lights illuminated at all times (...)”. See also: Morris 
v. KLM (2002) UKHL 7, the Court has observed that: “(...) So long as if occurred during the time 
when the passenger was in the charge of the carrier, the passenger was entitled ta be compensated for 
ifs consequences if the carrier was not able ta discharge the burden posed by article 20 of showing 
that he and his servants and agents had taken ail necessary measures ta avoid the damage or that it 
was impossible for him or them ta take such measures Often a failure to act results in an accident, or 
forms part of a series of acts and omissions which together constitute an accident. In such 
circumstances it may not be easy to distinguish between acts and omissions (...) how inaction itself 
can ever properly be described as an accident. It is not an event; it is a non-event. Inaction is the 
antithesis of an accident (...)”. In case: Povey v. Qantas Airways LTD (2005) High Court of Australia, 
the judge has noted that: “(...) It is hard to see how a failure to warn or advise passengers, a non-event 
as it were, can ever constitute an accident within the meaning of the article, notwithstanding the 
presence of surrounding circumstances which would make the failure unexpected or unusual (...)”. 
1CJEU, C-532/17, Wirth and others of 4 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:527, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. 
2CJEU, C-195/17, Krüsemann and others of 17 April 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:258,  published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. 
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source; that being said, a double level of vectorial responsibility was traced, on the 
basis of which the carrier was excluded the faculty to avail itself of the liberating 
test for the claims for compensation up to an amount equal to the equivalent in 
ECU of 100,000 special drawing rights, with possibility of exemption from liability 
only in the light of the demonstration that the damage was caused by the 
negligence of the injured or deceased passenger; with regard to the claims for 
compensation exceeding this limit, the carrier was granted the possibility of 
invoking the recurrence of exemption clauses from liability contemplated by the 
Warsaw Convention (Andrews, Nase, 2011, pp. 3ss; Havel, Sanchez, 2016)1. The 
Regulation also obliged the Community air carrier to pay the damaged party 
without delay, or in any case within fifteen days of its identification, the payment, 
by way of advances, of those amounts which may be necessary to meet the most 
immediate economic needs arising from the left, thus giving a favorable solution to 
an issue that had aroused strong contrasts and divergences within the work of 
revising the “Warsaw system” (Verschoor, Diederiks, 2012). 
This Regulation, however, has not decreed a total uniformity between the liability 
regimes of Community carriers, so much so as to make the subsequent adoption of 
EC Regulation no. 889/2002, with which, also due to the approval of the Montreal 
Convention of 1999, it was finally created, according to the point of view of the 
Community legislator, “a uniform system of responsibility for international air 
transport” (Balfour, Van Der Wijngaart, 2016, pp. 514ss; Grief, Losy, 2010-2011, 
pp. 529ss; Field, 2006, pp. 238ss; Cheng, 2004, pp. 834ss). 
In the field of international air transport, a situation of coexistence has 
progressively been established between a plurality of disciplines and legislative 
texts on the liability of the air carrier. And in fact, already on the occasion of the 
Montreal Diplomatic Conference in 1975, the significant difficulty of bringing the 
discipline of air transport into a single text of uniform law was acknowledged, so 
much so that at the outcome of that Conference four protocols were approved 
amendment of the Warsaw Convention, the first three of which affected the 
compensation limits provided for in the original text of the Convention, the one 
                                                     
1The liability regime introduced by the Regulation in question infringed the “psychological threshold” 
of the limits of compensation, deriving from the deemed necessity of the airlines to be able to count in 
terms of costs the possible obligations for compensation deriving from the exercise of the company; 
as can also be seen in Regulation (EC) n. 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 September 2008 laying down common rules for the provision of air services in the Community 
(recast). 
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amended by the 1955 Protocol and the one amended by the 1971 Protocol, while 
the fourth also changed the carrier's responsibility for freight transport and the 
regime of transport documentation. 
In the “common international conscience”, therefore, the opinion had matured that 
the eventual conclusion of a new Protocol to amend the Warsaw Convention would 
have determined a further fragmentation of the matter, and this would certainly not 
have facilitated the process of strengthening the protection of the passenger who, in 
fact, has always inspired international legislator. The opinion thus matured that it 
would have been appropriate to prepare a new international air transport 
convention, intended to replace the previous, and by now very old, one of 1929, 
and to the large number of amendment protocols, as well as to include the 
discipline on liability of the de facto carrier as envisaged by the Guadalajara 
Convention of 1961 (Schmid, 2006, pp. 81ss; Kwon, 2016, pp. 99ss; Mirmina, 
1996-1997, pp. 2ss; Grassi, 2014, pp. 55ss)1. 
Like the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Convention applies exclusively to air 
transport that presents the requirements of internationality, as defined in art. 1 of 
the Convention, pursuant to which air transport cannot be considered international 
in which, although there is a flyover over a state other than that from which the air 
transport has begun and is terminated (De Gama, 2017), there is no stopover 
outside, or the call at all foreign countries have not been foreseen in any way, nor 
have they been wanted by the parties (Assis De Almeida, 2008). Furthermore, 
transport can be both onerous and free, as long as, in this case, it is carried out by 
an air transport company. 
 
                                                     
1It is reasonable to assume that the Montreal Convention has, at least in part, pursued this “summary” 
purpose, given that the Regulations subsequently approved in the Community context have only 
affected very sectorial aspects of the discipline, as was the case for Regulation n. 261/2004 which 
introduced, as will be seen below, common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers for 
denied boarding, flight cancellation or prolonged delay, as well as for Regulations 785/2004 and 
285/2010 which have reformed the regulations the insurance requirements of air carriers. And indeed, 
Regulation 889/2002 was precisely inspired by the desire to extend and strengthen the effectiveness 
of the Montreal Convention, providing for the extension of its provisions also to national air transport. 
See also from the CJEU: C-321/11, G. C., M.-R. v. I., L. SA of 4 October 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:609, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. C-394/14, S. Siewert and 
others v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH of 21 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2377, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. The Court stated that the company was not exonerated from its 
obligation to pay compensation to passengers due to the long delay of the flight and the event was 
inherent to the normal operation of the air carrier that was to compensate the passengers. 
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2. The Liability of International Air Carrier Pursuant to 1999 Montreal 
Convention and Community Regulations 
Until the adoption of Regulation n. 889/2002 from the European Parliament and 
Council, therefore, the national air transports were not destined to fall within the 
ambit of application of the Montreal Convention of 1999, and remained disciplined 
by the Regulation 2027/97, where they were carried out transports from community 
carriers1. The Regulation provided for the abolition of compensation limit and 
resumed the two-tier system arising from the 1996 Miami Interprovectoral 
Agreement, for the first time also applied to internal flights; in the event of 
contributory negligence of the injured (Beale, Hartkamp, Kötz, Tallon, 1984, pp. 
282; Twigg-Flesner, 2013)2, the carrier was allowed to be exonerated, totally or 
partially, from its liability according to the applicable law, proving that the 
negligence of the injured or deceased passenger had caused the damage, or had 
contributed3. 
The Montreal Convention explicitly recognized the important contribution to 
unification of rules relating to international air transport offered by the 1929 
Warsaw Convention and other “connected instruments”, but considered it a priority 
to “adapt and recast” them in a single text, in order to “protect the interests of users 
of international air transport” and “guarantee fair compensation according to the 
principle of reparation”4, in the belief that “the collective action of states aimed at 
further harmonization and codification of certain rules that regulate international 
air transport by means of a new Convention represents the most appropriate means 
of achieving the right balance of interests”5. 
                                                     
1Pursuant to which “the carrier is not liable for damages pursuant to art. 17, paragraph 1, which 
exceed the 100,000 special drawing rights per passenger if he demonstrates that: a. the damage is not 
due to negligence, unlawful act or omission of one's own or employees or agents; b. the damage is 
due exclusively to negligence, unlawful act or omission of third parties. 
2According to the jurisprudence see: Chan c. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.–U.S. Supreme Court 18 April 
1989, which is affirmed that the Montreal Convention: “(...) is a private agreement among Airlain 
company, which cannot and does not purport to amend the Warsaw convention (...)”. 
3To exempt itself from liability, the carrier must prove: a) that the damage that has actually occurred 
(such damage) was not (was not two to) due to negligence or any other unlawful act or omission by 
the carrier or its servants or agents; b) that the same damage was due solely (was solely due to) the 
negligence or other unlawful act or omission of a third party. 
4CJEU, C-302/16, Krijgsman of 11 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:359, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases. 
5See Distrect of Court of New York: Tobias Weiss and Gertrude O. Weiss, Plaintiffs, v. El al Israel 
Airlines ltd of 22 May 2006: “(...) the drafters of the Montreal Convention were aware of the 
difficulty in defining delay and were willing to leave the determination of what does and does not 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
151 
The European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation n. 889/2002 with 
which the principles introduced by the Montreal Convention on air transport of 
passengers and their baggage were also applied to transports carried out in a single 
member state, and the previous Regulation 2027/1997 was amended in order to 
align it with the provisions on the Montreal Convention and thus create a “uniform 
system of responsibility for international air transport” (Bokareva, 2015, pp. 3ss; 
Schoonover, 2011, pp. 36ss). The adoption of this Regulation was motivated by the 
deemed need that the provision of unlimited liability of the carrier in the event of 
death and injury of passengers would also be applied to national transport, so that 
the Community air carrier, regardless the national or international character of the 
transport performed, could make use of art. 21, paragraph 2, of the Montreal 
Convention only in cases in which it demonstrates that the damage was not due to 
negligence, unlawful act or omission of its own or of its employees or appointees. 
This Regulation highlighted the need for Community air carriers not to apply 
different liability regimes on various routes of their networks, as this would not 
have been useful and could have created “confusion for passengers” and, moreover, 
reiterated the requirement, formalized by art. 50 of the Montreal Convention, that 
member states ensure that their air carriers are adequately insured, also in light of 
the fact that art. 7 of Council Regulation 2407/92 imposed this insurance obligation 
as a condition of issuing licenses. Articles 6 and 7 of the present Regulation have 
thus been indicated the parameters of minimum insurance coverage to be paid by 
air carriers for the specific responsibility connected to death and personal injuries 
caused by accidents, loss, destruction and damage of baggage and goods, as well as 
for the liability connected to damages suffered by third parties; the following art. 8 
introduced “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions consisting, for 
Community air carriers, the possibility of withdrawal operating license, and for 
non-EU air carriers and aircraft operators using aircraft registered outside the 
Community, the prohibition of landing in the territory of a member state1. 
                                                                                                                                       
constitute delay to the national courts. The minutes reflect that upon request from the Representative 
of China to incorporate a previously drafted definition of delay into what was to become Article 19, 
the Chairman of the Conference, supported by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, commented 
that because of the impossibility of drafting a precise definition for delay, the proposed definition 
would be struck in favor of leaving the definition to national courts (...)”. in the same orientation in 
the next cases: Mraz v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 2006 US Dist. Lexis 3961 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) and 
Kandiah v. Emirates (2007) O.J. No. 2540; 2007 ON.C. Lexis 2635. 
1Paragraph 1 of the art. 6 states that “for liability with regard to passengers, the minimum insurance 
coverage amounts to 250,000 SDRs per passenger”, and therefore sets minimum insurance 
requirements at a level significantly higher than the limits of liability dictated by the Montreal 
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The issue of adequate insurance coverage by air carriers in relation to passengers, 
baggage, goods and third parties was also perceived as a priority theme in the 
context of a common transport policy, in order to really guarantee effective 
passenger protection. Although the subject does not fall within the scope of this 
work, it is essential to mention Regulation n. 785/2004 regarding the insurance 
requirements applicable to air carriers and aircraft operators, with which the 
European Parliament and the Council have carefully established “the minimum 
insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators in relation to 
passenger insurance, baggage, goods and third parties”(art. 1), establishing that the 
said Regulation should apply to all air carriers that carry out flights within the 
territory of one of member states to which the treaty applies, with destination or 
coming from it, or flying over it. 
In fact, the need was felt to introduce the minimum insurance requirement for all 
air carriers with a valid operating license in all cases in which an air carrier or 
aircraft operator was liable, pursuant to the provisions of international agreements 
for passengers, baggage, goods and third parties. This need was based not only on 
reasons of “common transport policy and more effective consumer protection”, 
even in the situation that had arisen at international level following the attacks in 
the United States, and which had led the Commission to pronounce the 
Communications of 10 October 2001 and 2 July 2002 precisely in the field of 
insurance in the air transport sector. The EC Regulation n. 785/2004 was, lastly, 
amended by the recent EU Regulation no. 285/2010, with which the minimum 
insurance coverage was raised for liability arising from damage to baggage and 
cargo (Hodges, 2018; Walulk, 2018; Hodgkinson, Johnston, 2016; Fenwick, Siems, 
2017; Truxal, 2016)1. 
                                                                                                                                       
Convention. 
1See in argument: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and 
repealing Directive 94/56/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35-50; Regulation 
(EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common 
rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 
293, 31.10.2008, p. 3–20. Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 May 2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in the 
event of accidents (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 140, 30.5.2002, p. 2–5. 2001/539/EC: Council 
Decision of 5 April 2001 on the conclusion by the European Community of the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal Convention), OJ L 194, 
18.7.2001, p. 38-38. Regulation (EU) 2019/2 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 amending Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air 
services in the Community PE/61/2018/REV/1, OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 1-2. 
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The present “overview” of normative references in the field of international air 
transport contemplates, finally, the mention of EC Regulation n. 261/2004, through 
which the European Parliament and the Council have established common rules on 
compensation and assistance for passengers in the event of denied boarding 
(Hermida, 2001, pp. 150ss; Cotter, 2014, pp. 294ss)1, cancellation of flight (Ewers, 
Von Stackelberg, 1998, pp. 1172ss) or prolonged delay, repealing EEC Regulation 
no. 295/91. 
 
3. (Follows) Carrier Liability in Private International Law 
Moving on to the issue of transport contracts and responsibility of the carrier in 
private international law, we can say that without prejudice to the application of the 
connection criteria provided for by the Rome Convention to contractual obligations 
also to the air law relations among the most salient innovations that must be 
highlighted the widest space reserved for the application of the lex fori also in 
order to allow an easier coordination between substantive rules and procedural 
rules relating to the same relationship. The lex fori will be competent to regulate 
the implementation and graduation of the warranty rights on the plane. However, 
the application of rules of private international law are in many cases completely 
satisfactory, from various points of view: both because the connecting criteria 
adopted are sometimes very weak and not very significant, and because the 
legislation identified on the basis of these connection criteria cannot be consistent 
with the actual needs underlying the reports to be settled. The characteristics of the 
Conventions of uniform international law authorize their respective incompressible 
areas of application and the consequent role assigned to private autonomy and state 
systems both from the point of view of specifying the elements of internationality 
relevant and ratione materiae determination of cases to which the uniform 
regulation refers both to the necessary moments of connection with the laws of the 
contracting states. These characteristics impose their mandatory and binding 
assessment of situations and relationships to which they refer, prevailing over the 
                                                     
1 See the legislative resolution of 5 February 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 which establishes common 
rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding, flight 
cancellation or long delay and regulation (EC) no. 2027/97 on the liability of the air carrier with 
regard to air transport of passengers and their baggage (P7_TA (2014) 0092). In the same spirit see 
the case: C-532/17, Wirth and others of 4 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:527, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases. C-257/16, Roch and Roch of 18 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:628, not 
published. 
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provisions autonomously placed on the matter by national legislators therein 
compressed internal conflict rules. Article 10 of the 1924 Brussels Convention 
provided that it applied to all transport contracts for which a bill of lading was 
issued in a contracting state. This requirement explicitly envisaged if it were to be 
accompanied by an implicit constituted by the international character of the 
relationship. Understood in an objective or even in a subjective sense. The 
elements of internationality of transport relevant to the application of 1924 
Brussels Convention are being confirmed at the level of positive law with the 
changes introduced by the Visby protocol in the Convention text (Katsivela, 2012). 
Rome I Regulation (Reg. CE 593/2008) of 17 June 20081 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations as for the other Regulations characterized by universal 
application the erga omnes character of the Regulation implies the impossibility for 
EU states to hire new agreements with third states on legal issues falling under 
Rome I Regulation, as indeed is provided for in Protocol n. 25 on the exercise of 
consistent competence attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The Regulation does not 
clarify the relationship between the law applicable to contractual obligations and 
international conventions of a material nature. The conventions of uniform law do 
not regulate the conflicts of laws concerning the transport contract but provide a 
material regulation even if not exhaustive of the shop in question. In the absence of 
a coincidence in content between the two sources, there is no reason to believe that 
Regulation n. 593/2008 excludes the application of uniform material provisions, 
which continue to apply in their material scope of application for the substantive 
regulation of transnational cases, regardless of which regulatory law is identified 
through the application of conflict rules. The Regulation is without prejudice to the 
application of international conventions governing the conflicts of laws inherent to 
contractual obligations, thus excluding the faculty of parties to choose which law to 
apply the contract, had referred precisely to foreign law, i.e. to a law other than that 
that naturally it would have been the regulator of contractors positions, all however 
with the insurmountable limit expressly determined within art. 3, par. 3 of the 
mandatory rules. In this case the conflict of laws did not pre-exist, it did not derive 
from those that were the features of the economic operation that was intended to be 
carried out but was generated by the upstream choice made. The freedom of parties 
to choose the applicable law to a contract with cross-border features has its origins 
in the dogmatic-juridical acquisition of the twentieth century, namely the 
                                                     
1Commission Regulation n. 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 
2008 O.J. (L 177) 6. 
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distinction between materiellerechtliche and kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung 
elaborated by the German doctrine where first a legal order can take consideration 
of the circumstance of a rule of private international law, which assumes this 
circumstance as a decisive criterion for the designation of the law regulating the 
contract to which it is accompanied in the sense that such rules consider the 
connection as prevalent over any other and therefore decisive, the connection of 
that contract with the ordering to which the parties referred precisely to it. 
The autonomy of the contracting parties as can concretely be expressed through the 
determination of contractual rules formulated directly by the parties can thus 
manifest itself in the action of contractual rules of content equal to that of the rules 
that in a given legal system regulate the type of store to which that belongs that 
they constitute or even with the indirect determination of contractual rules by 
reference to a specific legal system. And this autonomy of the will unitarily 
conceived was extended to the point of including also the problem of identifying 
the applicable law which was solved by recognizing again the primacy of the law 
chosen by the parties. It follows that the norms of uniform material law of the 
Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, which regulate the air transport contract are 
conflict rules and therefore prevail over Community and national law regarding 
contractual obligations; in this case the exclusivity clause set forth in art. 29 of the 
Montreal Convention. The Regulation expressly provides for its replacement to the 
Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
in member states, specifying in art. 24, par. 2 that: “to the extent that this 
Regulation replaces provisions of the Rome Convention, any reference to this 
Convention is understood to be made to these Regulations”. Regulation n. 
593/2008 maintains the criterion connecting the will of parties regarding the 
transport of goods and passengers, albeit making significant changes, especially 
with regard to passenger transport. A discipline for cases in which there has not 
been electio iuris, in the matter of passenger transport, art. 5 par. 2 states that: “the 
parties may choose the law of the country in which: a) the passenger has habitual 
residence; or b) the carrier has habitual residence; or c) the carrier has its central 
administration, or) the place of departure is located, or) the place of destination is 
situated” in combination of the connection criteria appears in the first instance 
identical to that used by the Rome Convention. The introduction of the criterion of 
habitual residence would be added to the other usual connection criteria of the 
matter as a determinative presupposition of the jurisdiction facilitating the actor, 
who could propose the action in the place that is closest to them. On the other hand, 
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the introduction of a connecting criterion for the determination of the applicable 
law on residence in the absence of further factual connections with transport would 
have excessively favored the weak part of the relationship. The application of 
passenger's habitual residence law would have resulted in high fragmentation, in 
legal regulation of individual contracts and induced excessive legal uncertainty for 
the carrier. The criterion of the habitual residence of the passenger has the 
advantage of facilitating the coincidence between forum and jus and making the 
task of the judge easier. The “disadvantage” remains open for the carrier to 
introduce various laws applicable to a substantially unitary journey. The carrier is 
obliged to suffer the application of different laws depending on whether the 
passenger is resident in the initial or terminal location of the trip or who normally 
resides in a country other than the latter. This fragmentation poses for the carrier of 
other problems, which needs to be able to count on regulatory uniformity also in 
order to calculate the risk and to share the cost of any compensation among 
individual passengers. The absence of flag law appears to be in line with the 
developments of private international law, which seems to attribute to this 
connection criterion a scarce importance in the discipline of international juridical 
relations evidently as a consequence of the shadow flags phenomenon or those 
hypotheses in which certain states attribute their flag to foreign vessels even in the 
absence of a genuine link with the respective territory. The presence of an 
exception clause does not actually allow addressing the determination of the 
regulatory law of the contract to which is more protective of the passenger. The 
criterion of the closest connection cannot be used to designate the law that is 
materially more favorable to the weak subject of the relationship. The applicable 
law according to art. 5, par. 2 is “the country of habitual residence of the passenger, 
provided the place of departure or destination is located in that country”. 
If these conditions do not occur, the law of habitual residence of the carrier applies. 
That is also the most significant difference between Rome Convention and Rome I 
Regulation (Cheshire, North, Fawcett, 2017), since, in the Convention, the 
regulation of transport of persons in the absence of choice of law is identified by 
the presumption of the characteristic performance, which, founding the 
identification of the applicable law on the “function that the legal relationship 
carries out in the economic and social life of the country”. The rule in question 
must be interpreted in the light of recital n. 22 according to which the Regulation 
must be read in such a way as to guarantee continuity in the regulation of transport 
contracts with the Rome Convention and must be classified as transport contracts 
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with a carrier whoever has the obligation relating to transport regardless of the fact 
that carry out transport directly or not. Article 17 of the Regulation examined has 
resolved in an express way the question of the law applicable to compensation by 
providing that: “(...) if the right of set-off has not been agreed by the parties, 
compensation is governed by the law applicable to the claim for which it is asserted 
the right to set off (…)”. Rome Convention had not found a definite answer on the 
subject of compensation. It was the Court of Justice through judgment C-87/01, 
Commission v. Conseil des communes et règions d'Europe of 10 July 20031 to rule 
in favor of the competition of the two laws. According to the Court compensation 
could operate in this case. It was necessary that both the requirements imposed by 
national law and requirements provided by Community law were satisfied by 
stating that: “(...) any compensation of this nature requires that occurs as far as 
regards each of the credits in play that the conditions regarding compensation 
provided for by the legal system of which they are a part respectively are not 
disregarded (...)”. We can interpret that the criterion incorporated in the 
Community instruments that have resolved the issue of compensation could 
certainly opt for an autonomous solution to the conflict situation (Magnus, 2006, 
pp. 18ss). Specifically, art. 23 of the Regulation takes up Convention's solution and 
reiterates that international agreements that are in force regulate the conflicts of law 
on contractual matters prevail over the Regulation and will be included in a list that 
will be published. An exception is provided in the second paragraph of the same 
article that it prevails over the Hague Conventions of 1955 and 1978 only when the 
contract is intra-community, i.e.: “(...) when all the relevant elements of the 
situation are located, at the time of conclusion of the contract in one or more 
member states (...)”. Article 23 does not provide anything regarding international 
conventions that will conclude member states after its entry into force. From an 
interpretative point of view Regulation conditions the prevalence of the Regulation 
on Subsidies to the intra-community nature of the case does not clarify when it 
occurs2. 
The lack of choice for the passenger transport contract the Regulation provides for 
a subsequent competition of connection criteria. It provides that the contract is 
governed by the law of the country of passenger's habitual residence provided that 
                                                     
1ECLI:EU:C:2003:400, I-07617. 
2Articles 25 and 26 of the Regulations regulate that prevail over it are the international agreements in 
force governing contractual conflicts of law, establishing that these agreements will be included in a 
list that will be published. 
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the place of departure or destination is located in that country. The exception clause 
is provided according to which the possibility remains to assign relevance to the 
criterion of closer connection with a country other than that indicated in par. 2. Of 
course it may happen that the central administration of the carrier coincides with 
the place of departure or with that of destination of the trip. The power of choice of 
the applicable law may be directed only towards a regulatory law that presents 
material links with the case. This type of legal transaction belongs to the group of 
contracts for membership since it is concluded through the purchase of the ticket, 
as a result of which the traveler acquires the right to be transported from one place 
to another under certain conditions. The carrier has a considerable freedom of 
action since it can decide to locate the central administration in a third country, 
whose order is scarcely protective of the interests of the user in order to make the 
choice of law possible for the various contracts that intends to stipulate, in this case 
the transporter manages to make applicable a regulation that has not been the 
subject of community harmonization. The faculty of choice of the applicable law 
allows a wide margin of maneuver to the carrier both because the power of choice 
for the conformation of the relationship presents unilaterally and because the 
carrier can legitimately decide to locate its central administration in a country 
whose forecasts regulations are less protective of the passenger and then designate 
the latter as the law governing the contract. The power to determine the applicable 
law can be exercised to a certain extent by the carrier who can independently 
determine the conformation of contract regardless the mandatory rules of the 
country in which it decides to offer its service. The evaluation of the contractual 
relationship makes it possible to appreciate which profiles of carrier's responsibility 
escape the application of uniform legislation and are subject to discipline through 
conflicting mechanisms. 
Mechanisms of balancing between the interest of the company to the application of 
its law to an indistinct series of transport contracts and those of the user that can be 
favorably oriented towards the application of the law that it knows best and with 
which it has greater ease of approach as long as this law contains material 
connection elements with the contract. The provision in question does not provide a 
real balance between different laws applicable to an international transport contract 
but limits itself to introducing certain connection criteria that can lead to the 
application of one or other law through the use of mandatory rules or to 
concretization techniques of public order in favor of that which is more protective 
from the point of view of its material content (Leible, Lehmann, 2008, pp. 528ss; 
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Czepelak, 2010, pp. 47ss; Lando, Nielsen, 2007, pp. 30ss; Wilderspin, 2008, pp. 
260ss. Garcimartin Alférez, 2008, pp. 2ss; Ferrari, Leible, 2009; Kenfack, 2009, 
pp. 4ss; Plender, Wilderspin (eds), 2009, pp. 485ss; Twiggflesner (ed.), 2010, pp. 
243ss; Plender, Wilderspin, 2009, paras 8-13; Wagner, 2008, pp. 221ss; Nielsen, 
2009, pp. 106ss; Staudinger, 2012; Leible, 2014; Wagner, 2009, pp. 103ss; Koller, 
2013; Schollmeyer, 2004, pp. 78ss.; Clausnitzer, Woopen, 2008, pp. 1798ss; 
Clarkson, Hill, 2011, pp. 227ss; Gaudemet-Tallon, 2008, pp. 477ss; Van Calster, 
2016; Ancel, Deumier, Laazouzi, 2016; Magnus, Mankowski, 2017; Laval, 2016; 
Michaels, 2008, pp. 1608ss. 1607Ss; O’hara, Ribstein, 2008, pp. 2148ss; Stone, 
2016; Symeonidis, 2010, pp. 514ss; Goldammer, Jurcys, 2008. Ziegler, Takacs, 
2012-3013, pp. 2ss; Caravaca, 2009, pp. 53ss; Garcimartín Alférez, 2008, pp. 62ss; 
Mankowski, 2017). 
 
4. Liability of the Carrier for Default and Delay 
The non-execution of the contract unlike the delay was not governed by the 1999 
Montreal Convention, nor by (EC) Regulation n. 889/2002 (Woon Lee, Wheeler, 
2012, pp. 43ss), of suppression or delay of departure, interruption of the trip also 
due to force majeure, the passenger has the rights provided by EU legislation, or by 
Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
February 2004 which established common rules (Arnold, 2013, pp. 403-438) 
concerning compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied 
boarding, flight cancellation or extended delay (Leffers, 2010; Van Dam, 2011, pp. 
259ss)1. 
                                                     
1CJEU, joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, Sturgeon, G. Sturgeon and A. Sturgeon v. Condor 
Flugdienst GmbH and S. Böck and C. Lepuschitz and. Air France SA of 19 November 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:716, I-10923. The sentence was based on the Regulation of 11 February 2004, n. 
261 relating to compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and 
cancellation of the flight or prolonged delay. C-203/08, P. Rehder v. Air Baltic Corporation of 3 June 
2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:307, I-04695. The sentence was based on the Regulation (EC) of 11 February 
2004, n. 261 on pecuniary compensation based on the transport contract by strictly regulating the 
place of departure, the place of arrival of the aircraft between European Union countries. In the same 
orientation see also: joined cases: C-154/15 and C-146/15, K. Ruijssenaars, A. Jansen e J. H. Dees-Erf 
v. Staatssecretaris van Infrastructuur en Milieu of 21 December 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:908, 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases. CJEU: C-11/11, Air France SA v. H. G. Folkerts and 
L.T. Folkerts of 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:106, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases. With regard to compensation for damages, the Court stated that: “(...) for the purpose of 
compensation under Article 7 of EC Regulation 261/2004, it only detects the arrival delay, equal to or 
greater than three hours, and not even the delay at departure provided for in article 6 of the same text 
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The so-called overbooking is referred to the concept of non-fulfillment by the air 
carrier due to failure to provide the service (Aufner, 2005, pp. 66ss). More than 
overbooking we talk about overselling, that is to say over-selling, in the presence 
of the usual application by the carrier of the Ticketing Time Limit (TTL), 
consisting in the automatic cancellation of the booking not followed by the 
purchase of the ticket for the booked flight, within the times set by the carrier 
(Guerreri, 1989, pp. 192ss; Staudinger, Schmidt-Bendun, 2004, pp. 1897ss). The 
phenomenon of overbooking represents a commercial policy of the carrier as a 
remedy for the practice spread among travelers to make the reservation in a time 
prior to departure, in order to guarantee a safe place on board the aircraft, without 
being present at embarkation. To overcome the economic damage deriving from 
the aforementioned phenomenon, the carriers sell seats in excess of the availability 
of the aircraft on the assumption that not all passengers present themselves for 
boarding and that overbooking may not entail practical effects detrimental to 
passengers rights. In the case of scheduled flights at advantageous times and 
requested by travelers, carrier's forecast may be incorrect, with the result that some 
passengers are denied boarding. The carrier is in default towards them, with 
reference to the contractual obligation of transport. He cannot adduce any evidence 
that frees him from responsibility for not having the passenger reached his 
destination within the prescribed period, because he consciously and voluntarily 
accepted the risk of denying boarding to some users. In this spirit we recall 
Regulation (EEC) n. 295/91 of 4 February 1991, no longer in force since 17 
February 2005, because replaced by Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 through which a 
compensation system was introduced for denied boarding in scheduled air transport 
relative to all flights departing from a community airport except for cases of free 
transport only or carried out under favorable conditions according to art. 1 of 
Regulation as can also be seen through CJEU sentence in case: C-344/04, The 
Queen, ex parte: International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares 
Airline Association, v. Department for Transport of 10 January 2006 (Van Vooren, 
Wessel, 2014, pp. 237ss)1 and case: C-294/10, Andrejs Eglitis, Edvards Ratnieks v. 
                                                                                                                                       
... the right to compensation, given that such compensation is not subject to the existence of a delay at 
departure and, consequently, to the respect of the requirements established by said article 6 (...) “. Let 
us add that the Court relied on the art. 7, par. 1 of EC Reg. N. 261/2004 regarding the compensation 
and the cause of the delay satisfies the conditions of applicability of the art. 6, par. 1 of the same 
Regulation since the flight has already suffered a delay from its departure which exceeded the limits 
established by this provision. 
1ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, I-00403. 
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Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas ministrija of 12 May 20111, which CJEU 
affirmed that: “(...) the authors of the Convention intended to shield those carriers 
from any other form of intervention, in particular action which could be envisaged 
by the public authorities to redress, in a standardized and immediate manner, the 
damage that is constituted by the inconvenience that delay in the carriage of 
passengers by air causes, without the passengers having to suffer the inconvenience 
inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the courts (…)” (Verschoor, 
Diederiks, 2012). 
The Montreal Convention did not regulate overbooking. EU legislation is applied 
without exceptions or limitations, to passengers departing or arriving2 at an airport 
located within a EU member state (Dempsey, 2008, pp. 4-5, 66-67). This regime 
represented only minimal protection as was also stated in case: C-83/10, Aurora 
Sousa Rodríguez et al. v. Air France SA of 13 October 20113 where CJEU has 
sought to regulate and have the right of the passenger remaining on the ground to 
act in compensation for any further damage unless he voluntarily renounced his 
reservation in exchange for the compensation. 
With regard to damages caused by delay in the execution of the transport, they 
were imposed, pursuant to art. 19 of the Montreal Convention, on the carrier, save 
the release evidence consisting in the fact that he and his employees and 
supervisors had taken all the necessary and possible measures to avoid the damage. 
It was a presumed fault liability, with that already seen with reference to the 
hypothesis of non-fulfillment in the execution of the transport. The allegedly 
responsible carrier, when the passenger demonstrated the existence of a transport 
                                                     
1ECLI:E:C:2011:303, I-03983. 
2CJEU, C-452/13, Germanwings of 4 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2141, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases), of which it is necessary to retrace the salient passages. Initially, the 
Court established that the notion of “actual arrival time”, used to determine the extent of the delay 
suffered by passengers of a flight (in Article 2, 5 and 7 of Regulation No. 261/2004), must be 
understood as corresponding to the moment when the passenger confinement situation ends “in an 
enclosed space, where they are subject to the instructions and control of the air carrier and where, for 
technical and safety reasons, their possibilities of communication with the outside world are 
considerably limited”, a situation that does not allow passengers to” deal continuously with their 
personal, family, social or professional affairs”; so much so that, in its opinion, it cannot be said that 
the moment in which the wheels of the aircraft touch the landing strip of the destination airport, nor 
that in which the aircraft reaches the parking position and are operated the parking brakes or the brake 
blocks are positioned, since even in such situations passengers can be subjected to different 
constraints, due to the place where they are located. Subsequently, however, the Court establishes that 
the arrival corresponds to the moment in which at least one of the doors of the aircraft is opened, 
given that, at that moment, the passengers are authorized to leave the aircraft. 
3ECLI:EU:C:2011:652, I-09469. 
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contract for that flight and the relative delay, to exempt himself from any 
responsibility said to prove that the cause of delay was to be ascribed to an event 
not predictable and not attributable to he or his employees and supervisors in 
relation to this event. He was required to prove that he had acted with due 
diligence. On the contrary, the carrier could not exonerate itself if the cause of 
damage was attributable to the aircraft, such as its malfunction, to the crew or to 
airport manager, when this could be considered a person in charge of the transport 
debtor or if it consisted of the unavailability, recurrent, therefore predictable of a 
slot route slot (Goeteyn, 2007, pp. 196ss)1. 
The difficulty of identifying the time and space limits that determine a delay such 
as to entail a liability for the carrier is always open, also because a precise term 
within which the transport must be performed, is not foreseen nor by the 
conventional standard uniform, nor from the community one, or from the 
navigation code. Nor can it detect what can be deduced from the ticket, given that 
the general conditions of air transport of people, drawn up in IATA, to which most 
of the airline companies adhere, reported in an extract on the back of the ticket, 
establish that the times indicated in the tickets and during the hours are not 
guaranteed. Obviously the possible vexatious nature of the clauses included in the 
transport contract, which limit or exclude carrier's liability, can be envisaged, thus 
creating an imbalance between parties' performances. 
With regard to the extent of delay, for which the carrier may be called upon to 
respond, the doctrine in the past claimed that transport must be carried out within a 
reasonable time, adopts an objective evaluation criterion (Mateesco Matte, 1964, 
pp. 410ss) and considers that a hypothesis of delay in the event that the aircraft 
reaches its destination in a considerably longer time than the average one required 
(Smirnoff, 1967, pp. 259ss; Tosi, 2004, pp. 1121ss; Goldhirsch, 2000; Goldhirsh, 
1988) determined on the basis of times provided by the air carrier for the 
performance of an air transport of that type, leaving the decision appealed to the 
fair judge on the existence or otherwise the delay (Gronfors, 1956, pp., 120ss; 
Litvine, 1970; Mankiewicz, 1989, pp. 240ss. F. Manuhutu, 2000, pp. 265ss; 
Cachard, 2016). 
Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 expressly established the extent of delay which 
obliges the carrier to pay the minimum protection to the passenger. The passenger 
                                                     
1See the communication of the European Commission entitled: An action plan for airport capacity, 
efficiency and safety in Europe of 24 January 2007. 
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can agree on the carrier even in the event of delay lower than that provided for by 
the regulation in question (not compensated) when significant damage has arisen 
(Schubert, 2007, pp. 65ss)1. 
In order for the carrier to be held liable for delay, the passenger who acts in court to 
obtain the relevant compensation for damages must prove the existence of delay, as 
well as that it occurred within the aforementioned space-time limits and must prove 
the existence of damage, consisting in a reduction in assets or injury to psycho-
physical integrity as a direct consequence of the delay itself as was also stated 
through the Court of Justice in case: C-83/10, Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and others 
v. Air France SA of 13 October 2011. The difficulty encountered by the passenger 
in providing the substitute proof of the damage in question is evident, so much so 
that the jurisprudence on the subject is oriented in attributing compensation to the 
passenger even if no proof of damage is provided, both in case of non-execution 
and delay, frequently for the determination of the same resort to empirical criteria, 
such as the one constituted from a fraction of the ticket price. 
Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 introduced, on 17 February 2005, fundamental 
changes with respect to the previous legislation, assigning minimum rights to 
passengers in the event of denied boarding to non-consenting passengers for flight 
cancellation and delay. Clear indications of this new trend can be found in the 
recitals of CE Regulations 261 of 2004 (which establishes common rules on 
compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of failure to board, flight 
cancellation or prolonged delay) and Regulation 2111/2005/EC (Stephen Dempsey, 
                                                     
1CJEU, C-173/07, Emirates Airlines v. Schenkel of 10 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:400, I-05237, 
which the CJEU has accepted the application of Regulation (EC) 261/2004: “(...) applied to a return 
trip from a non-Member State origin by a non-community carrier on a round trip itinerary (...)”. In the 
same spirit of orientation the next case: C-344/04, International Air Transport Association and 
European Low Fares Airline Association v. Department for Transport of 10 January 2006, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, I-00403, where the CJEU has denied the suitability to base the judgment of 
illegality of the contested Regulation; although confirming that the Community is bound by the 
conventional rules as a contracting party, the judges of the Court did not recognize any violation by 
the articles. 5, 6 and 7 of the contested Regulation on which the ITA and ELFAA (European Law 
Fares Airline Association) complaints were pinned. The ruling established that the Montreal 
Convention is the exclusive object of the discipline of compensation for damages: “(...) on an 
individual basis which (...) derives to passengers from the prolonged flight delay (...) the two texts 
regulations would be characterized by a different field of application ratione materiae since the 
conventional rules are preordained to regulate the compensation due to the traveler due to the 
damages individually reported for not having reached their destination on time (...)”. We can say that 
the scope of application of the Montreal Convention cannot be said to be limited to compensation for 
the individual damages suffered by passengers in quantifying the indemnifiable damage to the single 
passenger that should be traced back to the art. 6 of the Regulation examined. 
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Jakhu, 2016)1 (which established a Community list of air carriers subject to an 
operating ban). EU legislator, in fact, expressly aims to establish rules capable of 
guaranteeing a “high level of protection for passengers” (1st recital of EC 
Regulation 261/204), also ensuring “effective publicity to information relating to 
safety” (9th recital of EC Regulation 2111/05). The ultimate goal is to allow 
passengers to “effectively exercise their rights” (20th recital of EC Regulation 
261/04) while ensuring “their right to make an informed choice” reaching “a fair 
balance between commercial viability of air carriers and passenger access to 
information” (14th recital of EC Regulation 2111/05)2. The synoptic reading of 
recitals shows that alongside the protection of market transparency (and therefore 
of correct competition), passenger's figure as a weak subject of the contract arises, 
now in the foreground. In a liberalized market it is essential to guarantee the right 
to information, in order to allow the passenger to make informed and prudent 
choices, rewarding the commercial policies of some airlines knowing that they do 
not go beyond the minimum levels of safety and commercial fairness required. 
Lastly, in fact, market transparency should allow the survival of the most virtuous 
carriers, favored by passengers' preferences, at least in theory (Bobek, Prassl, 
2016). 
The aforementioned Regulation has also sought to provide these passengers with 
the type of assistance of their choice, alternatively between the following options: 
reimbursement within 7 days of the full price of the ticket, at the same price at 
which it was purchased for the part(s) of journey not made, and for the part or parts 
of the journey already made if the flight in question has become useless with 
respect to passenger's initial journey schedule, or, possibly, to a return flight, as 
soon as possible, to the initial departure point. Boarding on an alternative flight to 
the final destination. In comparable transport conditions that in this case the 
amount of the expected sum of money can be reduced by 50% depending on the 
actual time of arrival at destination, compared to that of the original flight and the 
length of the flight itself. Boarding on an alternative flight to the final destination, 
in comparable transport conditions, at a later date of your choice, depending on the 
                                                     
1Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2005 
on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the 
Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and 
repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 15-
22. 
2CJEU, C-255/15, Mennens of 22 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:472, published in the electronic 
Reports of the cases. 
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availability of seats according to art. 8 of the Regulation (Dempsey, 2008). 
The passenger who has been denied boarding then has free right to meals and 
drinks proportional to the waiting time. To the possible accommodation in a hotel 
for overnight stay or for a further stay than the one provided by the passenger; to 
transport from the airport to the place of accommodation and to two telephone calls 
or messages via telex, fax or e-mail according to art. 9 of the Regulation. It is 
recognized according to art. 11 of the Regulation to the non-consenting passenger 
unlike the provisions for the consenting passenger the right to request additional 
compensation from which the compensation obtained with the aforementioned 
methods can be deducted. 
In the event of flight cancellation that according to art. 5 of the Regulation must 
signify the failure to carry out an originally planned flight and on which at least 
one seat has been booked, the passengers concerned are offered the possibility of 
choosing between the aforementioned options pursuant to art. 8 of Regulation as 
well as the possibility of making two telephone calls or messages via telex, fax or 
e-mail. In addition, if the passenger chooses the alternative flight and departure 
time that can reasonably be expected for the new flight, it is postponed by at least 
one day with respect to the scheduled departure time for the canceled flight, the 
passenger has the opportunity in relation to the waiting time, to take advantage of 
meals and drinks and to receive adequate hotel accommodation, in addition to the 
aforementioned monetary sum unless the carrier provides proof of having informed 
the passengers of the cancellation of the flight within the time indicated by the 
Regulation with exclusive regard to the sum of money mentioned above that the 
cancellation of the flight is due to exceptional circumstances that could not have 
been avoided even if all the necessary measures had been taken according to art. 7 
of the Regulation. If the reasonably foreseeable departure time is postponed by at 
least one day, with respect to the one originally set, the carrier must provide 
assistance in the following forms: hotel accommodation, transport between airport 
and hotel, or other place of accommodation. If the delay is equal to or greater than 
5 hours, the carrier will refund the full price of the ticket according to times and 
methods established by the Regulation. 
The most significant difference between Regulation (EEC) n. 295/91 and new 
Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 concerns its scope of application. The Regulation 
applies to any operating air carrier, whether Community or non-EU, or for 
scheduled or non-scheduled transport departing from a member state, as well as to 
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any Community carrier operating a flight to a EU country. These applicability 
requirements are supplemented by the additional assumption that passengers are in 
possession of a confirmed booking on a flight among those subject to Regulations 
that they present themselves for acceptance in accordance with specific procedures. 
The Regulation does not apply to passengers traveling for free or at a reduced rate 
indirectly accessible to the public with the new exception of ticket holders placed 
under a frequent flyer program or other commercial program implemented by air 
carrier or tour operator. 
The relationship between new Regulation and other regulations previously 
highlighted certainly the recourse to community regulations guarantees a minimum 
level of protection and does not prevent the creditor from using a different regime 
that can at least theoretically guarantee him a higher compensation (Finger, 
Holvad, 2013, pp. 59ss)1. The new legislation specifies that the compensation 
granted under the Regulation can be deducted from further compensation. In 
consideration of this principle, the coexistence of these regulatory instruments has 
been affirmed. 
Another novelty is the express indication of the obligation for the carrier to make 
an appeal in advance to the volunteers based on Regulation (EEC) n. 295/91 was 
purely eventual and left to carrier's discretion to try to avoid having to deny 
boarding to those passengers who, like booking volunteers, cannot absolutely 
renounce to leave on schedule. For volunteers Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 
establishes express and specific forms of protection: the assistance referred to in 
the aforementioned art. 8 and additional benefits agreed between the consenting 
passenger and carrier, distinct from those granted to non-consenters. The old 
Regulation provided for a unified protection with the only distinction however re-
proposed by the new legislation on the exclusion of the right to additional 
compensation for volunteers (Lawson, Marland, 2011, pp. 99ss; Dempsey, 
Johansson, 2010 pp. 208ss)2. 
                                                     
1See on the subject: Regulation (EC) n. 1794/2006 of the Commission, of 06 December 2006, which 
establishes a common tariff system for air navigation services. Following the modification of the 
Regulation (EC) n. 1191/2010 by the Commission, which came into force on 06 January 2011, the 
common charging system is subject to the principles set forth in the previous Regulation (EC) n. 
550/2004 and compatible with the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Service providers must provide details of the costs 
associated with the provision of their services, general administrative costs, training expenses, study 
expenses, audits and tests as well as research and development costs. 
2The notion of “additional compensation” pursuant to art. 12 of the EC Regulation n. 261/2004 must 
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Obviously the sum of money provided by the new legislation to be paid for denied 
boarding is undoubtedly greater than that established by the previous one. 
The new legislation indicates as subject all the forms of protection provided for 
therein, the operating air carrier while the old regulation simply refers them to the 
air carrier, meaning an air carrier operating or intends to make a flight within a 
contract with a passenger or on behalf of another person, natural or legal, who has 
a contract with that passenger. This latest news was introduced to make the new 
legislation applicable also to passenger transport, carried out by resorting to new 
forms of aircraft utilization that are found in practice, such as wet leasing and code 
sharing, in which the subject who physically carries out the transfer is different 
from the one who issued the ticket of passage as well as in all the cases in which he 
is an organizer of an all-inclusive trip (Van Houtte, 1940, pp. 86ss; Moll-Osthoff, 
2013, pp. 368ss; Crawford, 2010, pp. 17ss; Moore, 2001, pp. 224ss; Cunningham, 
2008, pp. 1043ss; Stewart, 2015; Ford Ferrer, 2012, pp. 128ss; Abeyratne, 2017; 
Adeyratne, 2016)1 to stipulate with the carrier the transport contract in favor to 
tourist-passenger (Corona, 2012, n. 7). In this latter case, both monetary sum and 
other various forms of assistance guaranteed to passengers are paid directly to the 
tourist who is protected not only in the case of a prolonged delay but also in the 
event of flight cancellation (Polkowska, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                       
be interpreted in the sense that it allows the national judge, under the conditions established by the 
international law of uniform law or national law, to grant compensation for damage, including that of 
a moral nature. Italy should not have always included moral prejudice in the notion of damage, also in 
application of the Warsaw Convention and then of Montreal; and, finally, the Spanish judge should 
not have asked the European Court of Justice (in case 83/10) for clarification in this regard. 
Furthermore, the reference to the so called soft law in order to derive a norm of general international 
law, in the form, since it is a draft Convention which (dating back to 2001) has no longer been 
followed, in substance, as this concerns damage caused by a international offense attributable to a 
State, for which it is not at all certain that it could derive a civil law notion of damage, which 
concerns the relations between citizens; and, finally, in the method, because, in doing so, the uniform 
international discipline would be interpreted from the outside, contravening what is required by the 
art. 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
1CJEU, C-168/00, Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Go KG of 12 March 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:163, I-02631. The CJEU has interpreted the art. 5, n. 2, fourth paragraph of 
Directive n. 314/90, and clarified that: “(...) since the rule allows that, as regards damages other than 
corporal ones, the Member States may admit that the compensation is contractually limited, provided 
that this limitation does not is unreasonable, this means that the Directive implicitly recognizes the 
existence of a right to compensation for moral damages ... which cannot be unreasonably compressed 
by the national legislator (...) the art. 5 of the Directive must be interpreted in the sense that in 
principle the consumer has the right to compensation for the non-material damage deriving from the 
non-fulfillment or from the improper performance of the services provided on the occasion of an “all-
inclusive” trip (...)”. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol. 12, no. 1/2019 
   168 
Particular importance is given to the inalienability of the passenger for the rights 
deriving from the new discipline, as it was intended to affirm the impossibility to 
derogate or restrict the vectorial obligations provided for by art. 15 Regulation by 
means of clauses included in the transport contract. The new Regulation provides 
for the operating air carrier that has launched a monetary sum or the 
aforementioned forms of assistance, the right to request compensation from 
anyone, including third parties, in accordance with the applicable law, as well as to 
take action against a tour operator with to which you have contracted to obtain a 
refund or vice versa (Giesberts, Kleve, 2009 pp. 293-304; Bobek, Prassl, 2016). 
The obligation of each member state to designate a body responsible for the 
application of new Regulation for flights departing from its territory and for those 
directly coming from a third country. On the other, the right for the passenger was 
also stated, which considers that it has been the victim of a violation of its own 
rights sanctioned by the same Regulation, to present a complaint to each 
responsible national body, which can adopt effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions, thus guaranteeing a more concrete protection to the passenger. 
The legislative decree of 27 January 2006 n. 69 also introduced the sanctioning 
provisions for the violation of Regulation (EC) no. 261/2004 providing that ENAC 
is the body responsible for the application of the Community Regulation and 
implements the envisaged administrative sanctions. In reality, the air carrier that 
fails to pay the compensation to passengers for denied boarding is punished with an 
administrative sanction from € 10,000 to € 50,000. If he fails to pay the 
compensation to passengers for flight cancellation (MILNER, 2009 pp. 216ss)1 he 
is punished with an administrative fine of € 2,500 to € 10,000. If he does not 
provide accommodation in the upper or lower class, he is punished with an 
administrative fine ranging from € 1,000 to € 5,000. If the provisions establishing 
the precedence and assistance to persons with reduced mobility and 
unaccompanied children are violated, the carrier is punished with an administrative 
fine ranging from € 10,000 to € 50,000. Finally, in the event of a breach of 
information obligations, an administrative fine between 2,500 and10,000 € is 
                                                     
1According to the ruling of the EC Court of Justice, pursuant to Regulation (EC) n. 261/2004 it is 
possible to speak of a cancellation: “(...) when the flight initially planned and delayed pours into 
another flight, that is when the programming of the original flight is abandoned and the passengers of 
the latter join those of a flight in turn scheduled, regardless of the flight for which the passengers thus 
transferred had made their reservation (...) “while the flight is delayed and cannot be considered 
canceled, when:” (... ) regardless of the duration of the delay and even if it was significant (...) it 
involves a departure in accordance with the originally planned schedule (...). 
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punished (Galand Carnaval, 2001, pp. 93ss; So, Chang, 2013, pp. 3ss)1. 
Market liberalization and the creation of ever new and heterogeneous forms of 
collaboration between air carriers (Dupont-Elleray, 2002, pp. 354ss; Scharpenseeel, 
2001, pp. 92ss; Andersen, 2009) aimed at a better exploitation of resources have 
led to unclear contractual structures for the passenger, who often came to know the 
identity of the subject who would have materially carried out the transport service, 
only once arrived at the airport, if not even at the time of boarding. It is obvious 
that in an ideal market in which virtuous subjects operate, the identity of the carrier 
may not be relevant. However, without thereby wanting to carry the transport 
contract within the scope of the intuitu personae contracts, it must be assumed that 
for the purpose of proper competition and an informed choice on the part of the 
passenger, prior knowledge of the actual carrier is primary information, to be 
provided at the time of booking or, in any case, as soon as it is identified. 
In light of the brief overview of EU legislation, it can be concluded that the 
information concerning the air transport contract that it intends to stipulate must be 
made known and accessible to the passenger, obviously before the conclusion of 
the contract. However, we must ask ourselves in which language passenger 
information should be provided: it is clear that the carrier will not be able to 
prepare notices in every passenger's mother tongue. 
Therefore, the carrier must provide information in the official language of the 
country of departure and, of course, in one of the most widely spoken languages 
(English, French, German, Spanish, etc.), but this is no guarantee that the passenger 
actually manages to understand what is communicated to him. The opening of the 
market to an ever wider catchment area has statistically increased the percentage of 
passengers who only know their mother tongue. The answer to this problem is to be 
                                                     
1See also the Restatements prepared by the American Law Institute, including: civil liability (Torts), 
contracts, ownership, conflicts of law, international relations law and product liability. The 
Restatements are one of the most authoritative secondary sources and have extended a considerable 
influence in the judicial area. English law is decidedly more reluctant to the method of 
conceptualization especially in the field of torts, an area in which there are still evident traces of 
medieval forms of action (the six titles in which the oldest of the torts is still divided, that of trespass) 
and the traditional typicality of the remedies in tort often hinders jurisprudential evolution. English 
law and in particular the common law system was based on liability for unintentional harm 
(unintentional harm); the fault as tort of negligence that does not correspond to the violation of the 
general rules of prudence, caution, diligence, etc .; the specific duty of duty of care involved between 
the offender and the victim. There was no provision for a general negative duty clause (neminem 
laedere) as the injured party should prove the damage (damage) was caused by violence (breach of 
duty) and in the case that it has not been proven it does not exist in this case also responsibility. 
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found, in our opinion, in the best accessibility to information to all and in a duty of 
self-information of the passenger himself as was also stated in CJEU sentence: C-
486/11, JR Esteves v. Companhia de seguros Allianz portugal SA of 21 March 
20131. 
The European Commission launched on 13 March 2013 a proposal to amend EC 
Regulation no. 261/2004 (Arnold, De Leon, 2010, pp. 92ss), aimed at clarifying the 
unclear points and eliminating the gaps that over time have led member states to 
the uneven application of the Regulation text. If this were to be approved, the 
Parliament and the Council would change the number of questions relating to the 
right to assistance and compensation of passengers, also in relation to the issue of 
air delay. For reasons of completeness of exposition, it is necessary, then, at least to 
mention them, on the basis of a purely textual analysis of the proposal to modify 
EC Regulation n. 261/2004 (Balfour, 2010, pp. 72ss; Kim, 2008, pp. 32ss; Ritorto, 
Fisher, 2017, pp. 562ss). 
The first element of novelty, extremely relevant for the matter that interests us, is 
the definition, as well as the “departure time”, which coincides with the moment 
“in which the aircraft leaves the boarding gate, pulled or with its own engines (time 
of departure from the ramp) (art. 2, l. u), of the arrival time, which would coincide 
with the moment in which the aircraft reaches the landing door, operating the 
brakes parking (arrival time at the ramp) (art. 2, l.v). 
It must be remembered, however, that on this last point CJEU, in the Germanwings 
sentence of 4 September 2014, differently pronounced, considering as the arrival of 
the flight the moment when at least one of the aircraft doors is opened. It is 
possible, therefore, to consider that the notion proposed by the Commission, should 
it be approved, at the very moment of introduction of the new text of EC 
Regulation n. 261/2004, it would already be obsolete. 
With regard to welfare measures, some of the conditions for their provision are 
changed. Those referred to in art. 9, 1st paragraph, l. a) and art. 9, par. 2 °, which 
consist of meals, drinks and calls (or in any case communications), are guaranteed 
for the simple delay at the departure of at least two hours, without the relevance of 
the relationship between the delay (in any case more than two hours) and length of 
the air route. Those referred to in art. 9, par. 1, l. b) and c), which consist in the 
accommodation in the hotel and transport between airport and place of 
                                                     
1ECLI:EU:C:2013:188, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
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accommodation, are no longer provided when the departure time that can be 
reasonably foreseen is postponed by at least one day with respect to that previously 
provided, but when the delay is at least five hours and includes one or more nights. 
Except, with regard to hotel accommodation, the possibility that the flight covers a 
distance equal to or less than 250 km and the aircraft has a maximum capacity 
equal to or less than 80 seats (except for the case in which the flight is a 
coincidence). 
As many assistance measures, but qualitatively different from those referred to in 
art. 9, are then provided (pursuant to the new paragraph 5 of article 6) for delays on 
the track, over an hour, and less than five hours. In such cases, the air carrier is 
considered obliged to offer: access to sanitary facilities, drinking water, cabin 
heating or cooling, medical assistance, if necessary. In the case of a delay of more 
than five hours on the track (but no more), it is foreseen that the aircraft, unless 
impediments, must return to the boarding gate or, in any case, position itself in an 
area suitable for disembarking, so to allow passengers to get off and take advantage 
of the assistance provided in art. 6, par. 1 °. The latter element would lead us to 
assume that the delay on the track taken into consideration is only that which 
occurs at the start, during the boarding operations, were it not for the proposed 
concept, provided by the Commission, of “delay on the track”, with which 
reference is made “to the departure, time of stay on the ground of the aircraft 
between beginning of the boarding of passengers and the take-off time of the 
aircraft, or, on arrival, (at) time elapsed between aircraft contact with the ground 
and start of passenger disembarkation operations”. 
The introduction, in par. 2 ° of art. 6, for the case of delay, regulation of pecuniary 
compensation, which differs considerably from the application of this measure 
made by the EU Court of Justice, starting from the “Sturgeon” sentence of 19 
November 2009 (Gutman, 2014, pp. 79ss)1. The delay in arrival relevant to the 
                                                     
1CJEU, joined cases: C-402/07, Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v. 
Condor Flugdienst GmbH, op. cit., which has affirmed that: “(...) if the flight reaches its destination 
with a delay equal to or greater than three hours before the scheduled arrival time, the passenger has 
the right to compensation, since such compensation does not depend on the existence of a delay at 
departure and, consequently, to the respect of the art. 6 (...)”. joined cases: C-581/10 and C-629/10, 
Nelson of 23 October 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
the CJEU moves from the different classification to be attributed to the nature of the compensation 
established by the Regulation also for the delay to destination (according to the interpretation of the 
sentence 11.19.2009) with respect to to compensation for damage recognized by the Montreal 
Convention in the event of delay. The first represents: “(...) a compensation for the inconvenience that 
any passenger suffering from a prolonged delay bears regardless of the further prejudicial 
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emergence of the compensatory obligation, in fact, is no longer expected in the 
three hours, with respect to the established arrival time, but: five, for all the routes 
within EU and for routes to/from third countries up to 3500 km; of nine, for 
journeys to/from third countries between 3500 and 6000 km; of twelve, for 
journeys to/from third countries equal to or greater than 6000 km. Moreover, it is 
specified, this discipline also concerns the case in which that time indicated should 
differ between the originally scheduled arrival time and the one that actually 
occurred, when it was changed by the carrier, unless the change was communicated 
to the passenger at least 15 days before the original departure time. 
The regulatory framework that would derive from the introduction of the new 
concept of “prolonged delay”, never less than five hours and measured, for routes 
outside EU, depending on the length of the air route, does not seem, however, at all 
convincing. If the intention was to guarantee, better than in the past, the effective 
and consistent application of passengers rights, increasing their protection, 
certainly no such result has been achieved. As is evident, in fact, following such a 
discipline the rights of passengers come to be eroded. They would never enjoy 
compensation in the event of late departure less than five hours, unlike what is 
currently the case (which only takes three hours). In the case of non-EU flights, 
then, they would only be entitled to delays of more than six hours (for routes equal 
to or greater than 3,500 km) or to twelve hours (for those equal to or greater than 
6,000 km), which would seem to extend considerably the cases in which the 
companies are not obliged to pay pecuniary compensation. Among other things, it 
should be noted, it is also difficult to explain why the right to obtain compensation 
is based on different assumptions in the case of community flights rather than non-
EU, almost as if the inconveniences due to long waits, at departure, are different (in 
relation to their relevance) depending on the destination of flights (Dempsey, 
Milde, Khadjavi, 2004). On the other hand, Commission's intention to introduce 
par. 4 ° of art. 6, a specific provision aimed at regulating the possibility for the 
carrier not to pay the compensation, if it can prove that the delay or change in time 
                                                                                                                                       
consequences that each can bear further; the second one is the reintegration of the actual prejudice 
suffered by the individual due to the delay. The first can be identified according to standardized 
parameters (...) the second imposes the proof of the prejudice whose measure can vary according to 
the specific circumstances and the subjective conditions of each and which, in case of dispute, must 
be judicially ascertained (... )”. C-394/14, Sandy Siewert and others v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH of 
14 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2377, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. in 
relation to the long delay. The Court also relied on the exceptional circumstances of the delay. C-
429/14, Air Baltic Corporation AS v. Lietuvos Respublikos specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba of 17 February 
2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:88, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
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is due to exceptional circumstances and that this delay or change could not be 
avoided by adopting all reasonable measures in case (georgiadis, 1953, pp. 16ss; 
dempsey, 2004, pp. 231ss. choi, 2005, pp. 46ss; larenz, canaris, 2003, pp. 377ss; 
canaris, 1989, pp. 161ss)1 CJEU: C-12/11, Denise McDonagh v. Ryanair Ltd of 31 
January 20132. Among other things, the European Commission has specified that 
the exceptional circumstances can concern not only the flight in question, that is 
the one that has reported the delay for which the compensation is demanded, but 
also the flight previously operated with the same aircraft. 
It then comes to be specified, to the new art. 7, par. 2 °, that in the event that the 
passenger, following a delay of at least five hours, chooses to continue the journey 
pursuant to art. 8, par. 1, l. b), being repaid, through comparable transport 
situations, towards the final destination, as soon as possible, the compensation 
could be requested only once in relation to the journey to final destination as was 
also stated in CJEU cases: C- 321/11, Germán Rodríguez Cachafeiro, María de los 
Reyes Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor v. Iberia, Líneas Aéreas de España SA 
of 4 October 20123. It is not clear, however, whether or not this discipline also 
refers to the case of delay, expressly referring only to new cancellations and loss of 
a connection. However, it would appear to have to be answered in the affirmative, 
since it would replace the paragraph providing for the carrier the possibility of 
reducing the compensatory measure by 50%, which also applies to flight delays as 
established also in CJEU cases: C-22/11, Finnair Oyj v. Timy Lassooy of 4 October 
20124. 
                                                     
1CJEU, C-549/07, Wallentin-Hermann v. Alitalia 549/07 of 22 December 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:771, I-11061 which has specified that it cannot be considered as exceptional 
circumstance a technical problem to the aircraft due to lack of maintenance but can be considered 
exceptional: “(...) only those circumstances connected to an event that is not inherent to the normal 
exercise of the activity of the air carrier in question and which escapes its effective control due to its 
nature or origin (such as an aircraft construction defect such as to compromise safety, damage due to 
terrorism or sabotage, piracy, volcano dust) (...)”. And certainly the criterion of ascertaining the legal 
causality based on the preponderance of the evidence or of the more likely than not, which justifies 
the causal link between accident or pre-impact and shock in plane or train accidents, shipwrecks, 
piracy, terrorism, such as events considered certainly productive of psychologically relevant reactions. 
In particular, the German system distinguishes between: physical prejudice (e.g. pain), psychic 
prejudice (e.g. depression after aesthetic disfigurement), social prejudices (e.g. decrease in a person's 
social value) and prejudices about the quality of life developing in tempis, the figure of the 
allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht, or of the general right of the personality, as an additional asset 
whose injury gives the right to compensation for damages, even non-pecuniary ones. 
2ECLI:EU:C:2013:43, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
3ECLI:EU:C:2012:609, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
4ECLI:EU:C:2012:604, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, which the CJEU has declared 
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Finally, a new introduction would be art. 6 bis of the aforementioned Regulation, 
aimed at guaranteeing assistance and compensatory measures for the passenger 
victim of a loss of connection, following a delay or a change in the timetable of a 
previous flight. It is envisaged that if waiting times last for at least two hours, 
meals and drinks must be provided and the possibility of making communications 
must be given. 
The rerouting, even if it is not well specified, would seem to have to be provided, 
as well as for the delay referred to in art. 6 of the Regulation, should the wait be at 
least five hours, to which would be added the hotel accommodation and the transfer 
from the airport to the place of accommodation, if the time of the alternative means 
of transport provided was provided for at least five hours after the departure time of 
the missed flight and the delay included at least one night. In the event of loss of a 
connection following the delay of one of the previous connections, it is established 
that the passenger has the right to compensation, in accordance with the (new) art. 
6, par. 2, by the air carrier that operated the previous connection (for this purpose 
the delay is calculated by referring to the estimated time of arrival at the final 
destination). 
  
                                                                                                                                       
that: “(...) to ensure full effectiveness of these rules, the notion of denied boarding must be interpreted 
extensively and cannot be limited to” overbooking. “This is clear from the preparatory work for 
adoption According to the EU legislator, the practice of denied boarding is due to two reasons: the 
first is the need to transfer passengers who cannot take the flight they have booked due to operational 
problems such as the late arrival or cancellation of correspondence flights, or the replacement of a 
damaged aircraft with a smaller capacity aircraft, so the transferred passengers generate an 
unexpected demand for seats, which sometimes forces them to deny the boarding to the passengers of 
the next flight The second reason that involves the practice of “overbooking” is the “no-show” 
(passengers who do not show up at the departure of a flight p for which the fifteenth recital of the 
Regulation n. 261/2004 states that: “(...) (d) should be considered an exceptional circumstance the 
case in which the impact of an air traffic management decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a 
particular day causes a long delay, a delay leading to an overnight stay or cancellation of one or more 
flights for said aircraft (...)”. The legislator of the Union has not manifestly foreseen that the reason of 
the exceptional circumstances can be invoked by an air carrier in case of denied boarding. In this 
regard, as the Finnish Government has rightly pointed out, even in the event of cancellation or delay 
due to exceptional circumstances, the passenger benefits from the right to continue on another flight 
and to receive assistance, pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of the Regulation . On the other hand, nothing 
similar has been foreseen by the EU legislator regarding the passenger who is denied boarding. As we 
have seen, the passenger concerned is deprived of any assistance when his situation does not fall 
within the scope of application of Article 4 of the said Regulation. This confirms, in my opinion, that 
the EU legislator has not provided that the qualification of “denied boarding” can be excluded for 
reasons related to the occurrence of exceptional circumstances (...)”. 
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5. Liability of the Carrier for the Claims to the Passenger 
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention of 1999 regulates the liability of the air 
carrier for accidents, that is to say for death, wounding and any other bodily injury 
suffered by the traveler, bodily injury1. In reality, the liability of carrier for claims 
                                                     
1See also the Convention on the suppression of unlawful acts relating to international civil aviation of 
10 September 2010, not yet in force, par. 1 where the notion of bodily injury refers. See ex multis 
from international jurisprudence: Eastern v. Floyd, 499 Us. 530 (1991) where the Court examined the 
French meaning of the expression: “lesion corporelle” deciding that: “(...) a proper translation of the 
term “lesion corporelle” was “bodily injury” and it did not embrace mental injury. Secondly, the 
Supreme Court studied the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention and agreed that there was 
no evidence that that the drafters or signatories of the Convention specifically considered liability for 
psychic injury or the meaning of “lesion corporelle”. Lastly, the Court concluded that the Warsaw 
Convention's amendments (The Hague Protocol 1955 and The Guatemala City Protocol 1971) and the 
Montreal Agreement 1966 supported the narrow translation of “leision corporelle”. The issue whether 
passengers can recover for mental injuries accompanied by physical injuries is not presented or 
addressed here, since respondents do not allege physical injury or physical manifestation of in jury. 
Nor does this Court reach the question whether the Convention provides the exclusive cause of action 
for injuries sustained during international air transportation, since the Court of Appeals did not 
address it (...)”. El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 D.S. 155 (1999) Enrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 
360 F. 3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004), which is stated that: “(...) To address the issue presented by this appeal, 
we must reach the question left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Floyd (...) After reviewing that 
provision in accordance with the proper canons of treaty interpretation, we conclude (...) that Article 
17 allows passenger to bring a Warsaw Convention action against air carrier to recover for their 
mental injuries but only to the extent that they flow from bodily injuries (...)”. See also: The Northem 
District of Califomia in Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (854 F. Supp. 654,665(N.D. Cal 1994) and 
Lloyd v. American Airlines, 291 F.3d (2002) which is stated that: “(...) the happenstance of getting 
scratched on the way down the evacuation slide (should) not enable one passenger to obtain a 
substantially greater recovery than that of an unscratched co-passenger who was equally terrified by 
the crash (...) if we determined that a “physical in jury, no matter how minor or unrelated, “ could 
“trigger recovery of any and all post-crash mental injuries,” that conclusion would violate the “spirit 
of Floyd (...) we hold that permitting passengers to recover for mental injuries that were not caused by 
bodily injuries violates the spirit, rather than the letter of Floyd (...)”. King v. Bristow Helicopters 
LTD; Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airline which the JCEU has observed that: “(...) caused physical in 
jury. It may therefore cover mental injury caused by a physical injury (...) if a relevant accident causes 
mental in jury or illness which in turn causes adverse physical symptoms, such as strokes, 
miscarriages or peptic ulcers, the threshold requirement of bodily injury under the Convention is also 
satisfied. Bodily injury simply and unambiguously meant a change in some part or parts the body of 
the passenger which was sufficiently serious us ta be described as an in jury (...) The scientific 
developments have not changed the meaning of the article. The meaning of the phrase bodily in jury 
has not changed. The criterion or test remains the same. Ali that has changed is the ability of certain 
plaintiffs to bring their cases within it. Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, 1997, 42 N.S.W.L.R. 110, 
the court has affirmed that: “(...) the phrase can be taken to refer to a psychological in jury. This 
ambiguity can only be resolved by 100 king at the intention of the contracting parties and adopting a 
purposive approach to the interpretation of the Convention. It is immediately apparent that the 
adjective “bodily” is a word of qualification or limitation (...) that courts are not at liberty to consider 
any words as superfluous or insignificant (...) It is clear that the draftsmen of the Convention did not 
in tend to impose absolute liability in respect of ail forms of in jury. No evidence that the drafters or 
signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically considered liability for psychic or the meaning of 
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over time has gone from a limited liability regime for presumed fault to one based 
on unlimited and tendentially objective liability. 
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 stipulated that the carrier was responsible for the 
accidents that had struck the passenger from the start of the boarding to the end of 
the disembarkation operations, including the damaging event that occurred the 
aircraft on board. The legislator has not limited the space-time limits so that four 
solutions have been proposed. The boarding operations would begin and those of 
disembarkation would end: a) when the passenger gets on the vehicle that will 
transport him to the airport of departure and when he gets off the aforementioned 
vehicle at the place of destination; b) when the passenger enters the departure 
airport and leaves the destination airport; c) when the passenger leaves the terminal 
building to go to the aircraft when he enters the premises of the destination 
terminal; d) at the moment when the passenger sets foot on the ladder that will lead 
him inside the aircraft until the moment he descended from the aircraft he has set 
foot on land (Brecke, 2012, pp. 358ss). 
The carrier and its employees and supervisors could free themselves from this 
responsibility so as to exclude any liability for damages, proving that they have 
taken all the necessary measures to avoid damage according to normal diligence, or 
that it was not possible to adopt them in accordance with art. 20 of the Warsaw 
Convention (Benyon, 2013, pp. 41ss)1. If the passengers suffered damage from an 
unknown cause for a part of the doctrine they were at the expense of the carrier 
                                                                                                                                       
lesion corporelle (...) the unavailability of compensation for purely psychic injury in many common 
and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference persuades us that the signatories had no 
specific intent to include such a remedy in the convention. Potgieter v. British Airways, C.PD. High 
Ct. of South Africa, 2005, has observed that: “(…) humiliated and degraded and his “dignity was 
severely impaired” when a flight attendant approached the plaintiff and his male partner and 
requested them “not to kiss each other as doing so was offensive to other passengers on the flight (...) 
The plaintiff and his partner allegedly hugged and kissed each other in a normal way and manner 
which would have accepted between two heterosexual people (...)”. According to the art. 17 of the 
Montreal Convention the notion of bodily injury, that is the damage suffered by the passenger 
consisting in a physical pathology caused by a mental suffering to put in causal relationship with an 
accident occurred during an air transport, as long as proof of its existence is provided and of its causal 
relationship with the same claim. Position also inspired by the common law system. We must also 
take into consideration the common law systems, the protection of the interests inherent to the person 
has had the opportunity to develop in the case of the transport contract where the carrier has been held 
responsible for damages caused culpably to the passenger by admitting the competition between 
action in contract and in tort and the choice, between the two to offer a concrete reparative remedy to 
those who complain of an injury to his interests. 
1CJEU, C-139/11, Joan Cuadrench Moré v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV of 22 December 
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:741, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
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while the doctrine had raised doubts about it. 
The regulatory regime according to the Warsaw Convention has met with strong 
contrasts regarding the effective protection guaranteed to passengers in 
consideration of the release test provided for by art. 20 of this Convention. Despite 
the “threats” from the United States relating to the Warsaw Convention, IATA 
member carriers and the Civil Aeronautic Board concluded the Montreal 
Agreement of 4 May 1966, raising a compensation limit of up to $ 75,000 for each 
arriving passenger (Balfur, Van Der Wijngaart 2016, pp. 511ss), when departing or 
parked in the United States, waived the release test up to this amount, with the 
exception of the contributory negligence of the traveler, answering for any damage 
that could be connected to the flight also deriving from a fortuitous event or from 
force majeure. This agreement represents the first sign towards the transition to a 
tendentially objective responsibility, more responsive to the needs of protection of 
the victims and protection of the subject who suffers harm to his person. 
A strict liability regime, recognizing relevance not to fault but to causal link only, 
as well as providing carrier's liability for death or bodily injury suffered by the 
passenger on the sole condition that the event that caused the damage occurred in 
the timeline space already foreseen by the Warsaw system. For these damages it 
has eliminated the release document as for art. 20 of the Warsaw Convention with 
exclusive reference to the only damages with following delay in the execution of 
the transport. The Protocol identified two exempt factors of its responsibility: 
passenger's state of health and contributory negligence of the person who requested 
the compensation or of the passenger if a different subject is asking for 
compensation. The Guatemalan Protocol favors the spatial-temporal occurrence of 
damage as the criterion for imputing responsibility, no longer the criterion related 
to the accident. 
In reality, the unlimited liability system has determined and exceeded the Warsaw 
system and formed the basis of the old Regulation (EEC) n. 2027/97 (Clark, 2001, 
pp. 138ss) and the Montreal Convention of 1999 which consists of agreements 
between airlines of 1995-1996: IATA Intercarrier Agreement on passengers liability 
(ILA) of 31 October 1995, IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA 
Intercarrier Agreement (MIA) of 1 February 1996; ATA Provisions Implementing 
IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be included in Conditions of Carriage and Tarrifs 
(IPA) of 16 May 1996. In these agreements, the carriers have renounced in addition 
to the benefit of the compensation limit also the release test up to 100,000 DSPs 
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save the demonstration of contributory negligence1. 
According to Regulation (EEC) n. 2027/97 modified with EC Regulation n. 
889/2002 applicable to all Community carriers provided for a novelty with respect 
to the uniform international legislation in force at that time, the introduction of 
carrier's unlimited liability for passenger claims: objective up to the amount of 
100,000 DSP and subjective for presumed fault more than 100,000 SDRs with the 
relative possibility for the transport debtor to provide the release document 
sanctioned by the Warsaw Convention. 
Moreover, according to the same Regulation just mentioned, the carrier was 
obliged to pay an immediate and anticipated sum of money as a down payment on 
the greater damage. This sum had to be paid without delay and in any case no later 
than 15 days from the identification of the entitled party, if the injured party were a 
natural person so that he could face his most immediate economic needs. It had to 
be proportional to the damage suffered and in fatal accidents, the advance should 
not be less than 15,000 SDRs for each passenger. To protect the position of the 
carrier, the Regulation established that although he proceeded to bestow this lump 
sum2, this did not imply his admission of responsibility, on the other that he could 
in any case deduct the sum paid as a down payment from the final compensation. 
To guarantee the balance in parties' obligations, this sum was not refundable except 
in the event that the damage had been caused in whole or in part by the negligence 
of the injured or deceased passenger or if the subsequent demonstration that the 
beneficiary of the advance payment was provoked or contributed to the damage 
provoked by his negligence or if the latter was not the person entitled to 
compensation. 
This community regulation has been amended by Regulation (EC) n. 889/2002 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 May 2002 in force on 28 June 
2004 for the purpose of standardizing for Community legislation with that 
                                                     
1Figure also inserted by Regulation n. 2027/97. In reality, the community legislation has requested the 
demonstration by the carrier of the adoption of all the necessary and suitable measures to avoid the 
damage or the impossibility to prepare them while the Montreal Convention charges the same to 
prove that the accident is not depended on his negligence or that it derives from the negligent or 
unlawful conduct of third parties. 
2The Reg. N. 889/02 according to the art. 1, par. 7 which replaced Reg. No. 2027/97 limited itself in 
relation to the lump sum institute to raise the amount of the sum to be paid to the person entitled in 
the event of death. In this way the Regulation differs from the provisions of the Montreal Convention 
which provides for an unconditional obligation on the carrier to pay an advance in the event of death 
or injury to the passenger by subordinating this obligation to an express provision contained in the 
national legislation. 
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established by the 1999 Montreal Convention concerning the unification of certain 
rules relating to international air transport entered into force internationally on 4 
November 2003 and internationally on 28 June 2004. This Convention also 
establishes at international level, with the exception of the limited number of 
flights still subject to the Warsaw system, the introduction of principles of 
unlimited and predominantly objective already operating at Community level in a 
perspective of generalized uniformity as well as in line with the evolution traced by 
the aforementioned international agreements as well as by Regulation (EC) n. 
2027/97. An objective liability is sanctioned up to the amount of 100,000 DSP so 
that the carrier cannot limit or exclude its own responsibility only on the condition 
that the event that caused the death or injury occurred in the spatial-temporal arc 
already fixed from the Warsaw system while the carrier will be liable as a 
subjective liability for presumed fault beyond the aforementioned amount. 
In this last case, with a reversal of the burden of proof on his part, the carrier, in 
order to free himself from all responsibility, must provide proof that the damage is 
not due to negligence, unlawful act or omission of his own or of his employees or 
agents, unlawful act or omission of third parties. 
The difference with Warsaw system and Regulation (EEC) n. 2027/97 regarding 
the release test which does not consist in the adoption of all the necessary 
measures, suitable and possible to avoid the damage but in the existence of 
causative factors not attributable to the carrier. Damages from an unknown cause 
always fall on the carrier. 
As in the Warsaw system and in the previous EU legislation. it is established 
according to art. 20 that the carrier can invoke the contributory negligence of the 
passenger in the cause of all or part of the damage, to exonerate himself totally or 
partially from responsibility. The rationale for this provision is to be found in the 
need for uniform international legislation to avoid a heterogeneity in reference to 
the causal contribution of the injured party. Deriving from the diversity of 
discipline between civil and common law countries. While in the former the 
contributory negligence reduces the amount of compensation payable by the carrier 
in the common law countries. The principle applies according to which the person 
who is responsible for the immediate cause of the damage is liable in its entirety, 
even if other production has contributed to its production causes. 
The obligation to pay on account is thus imposed, which must be carried out by the 
carrier without delay in favor of the injured physical person to enable him to meet 
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immediate economic needs. It does not imply any admission of responsibility and 
can be deducted from the final compensation in accordance with what was foreseen 
by the Regulation (EEC) n. 2027/97. The Montreal Convention weakens the 
obligation in question, because it subordinates its existence to a specific provision 
by the national law of the carrier, thus sanctioning in fact a decrease in the degree 
of protection guaranteed to the injured according to art. 28 of the Montreal 
Convention. 
The Convention is applicable not only to the contractual carrier but also to the de 
facto carrier pursuant to art. 39 and that it is presumed that the transport is unique if 
such was considered by the parties to be void, noting whether it was stipulated with 
a few more contracts according to art. 1, par. 3 as also stated by the Court of Justice 
in joined cases: C-581/10, C-581/10 and C-629/10, Emeka Nelson, Bill Chinazo 
Nelson, Brian Cheimezie Nelson v. Deutsche Lufthansa of 23 October 20121, in 
order to allow the application of the discipline established by the Montreal 
Convention also to air transport whose points of departure and destination are 
placed on the territory of the same EU member state without stopping in another 
state the Regulation (CE) n. 889/2992 with which a uniform system of 
responsibility for international air transport has been created which guarantees a 
higher level of protection for passengers involved in air accidents (Mann, 2007, pp. 
401ss; Wetger, 2006, pp. 133ss; Hodgkinson, Johnston, 2016)2. 
                                                     
1ECLI:EU:C:2012:657, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
2See from the international jurisprudence: Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Parcel 
Service, 177 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998); Shah v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 Fed. Appx. 13 (2d Cir. 2010); Phifer v. 
Icelandair, F.3d, 2011 WL 3076393, 9th Cir. 2011; Rafailov v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 2008 WL 
1047610 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008; Walsh v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 2011 WL 
4344158; S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2011; Pacitti v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 2008 WL 919634, E.D.N.Y. April 3, 
2008; In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litigation, 520 F. Supp. 2d 447, E.D.N.Y. 2007; Paradis 
v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, S.D.N.Y. 2004; Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F. 3d 
1033, 11th Cir. 2009; Hornsby v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1132, C.D.Cal., 2009; 
Dickson v. American Airlines, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 623, N.D.Tex. 2010.  Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 
2012 FCA 246; O'Mara v. Air Canada, 2013 ONSC 2931 at 4; Gontcharov v. Canjet, 2012 ONSC 
2279, 111 OR (3d) 135. Ejidike v. Ethiopian Airlines, 2014, ONSC 1187, 2014 Carswell Ont 2771. 
Erlich v. American Airlines, Inc, 360 F3d 366, 371 n. 4, CA 2, 2004; Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, 
Ltd, 433 F Supp. 2d 361, 365, SD NY, 2006; Erlich, 360 F3d at 371 n. 4; Watts v. American Airlines, 
Inc, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 
issued October 10, 2007 (Docket No. 1:07-CV-0434); Yahya v. Yemenia-Yemen Airways & 
Northwest Airlines, Inc, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, issued August 25, 2009; Docket No. 08-14789; Aikpitanhi v. Iberia Airlines of 
Spain, 553 F Supp 2d 872; Aikpitanhi, 553 F Supp. 2d at 874; Fazio v. Northwest Airlines, Inc, 
unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, issued 
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This need for uniformity has also been implemented in the recent reform of the 
aeronautical part of navigation code and subsequent amendments. With regard to 
the indemnifiable damage, i.e. the damage that the carrier is responsible for and the 
damaged passenger has the right to compensation, it is emphasized that the 
interpretation of the term bodily injury envisaged by the Montreal Convention is 
not univocal (Dae-Kyu, 2004, pp. 20ss; Katsutoshi, 2001, pp. 334ss; Katsutoshi, 
                                                                                                                                       
March 15, 2004, Docket No. 1:03-CV-808; Mbaba v. Air France 457 F 3d 496, 2006 US App lexis 
18663; Brandt v. American Airlines 2000 US dist lexis 3164; Turturro v. Continental Airlines 128 F 
Supp. 2d 170, 2001 US dist lexis 360; Waters v. Port Authority and Alitalia 158 F Supp. 2d 415, 2001 
US dist lexis 11790; Brandt v. American Airlines 2000 US dist lexis 3164 at 7; Turturro v. Continental 
Airlines 128 F Supp. 2d 170, 2001 US dist lexis 360; Schroeder v. Lufthansa 875 F 2d 613, 1989 US 
App lexis 7515; Emery Air Freight v. Nerine Nurseries (1997) 3 NZlR 723; Burke v. Aer Lingus 
[1997] 1 I.l.R.M. 148; Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines 821 F 2d 422, 1987 US App lexis 8033; Fishman 
v. Delta Air Lines 132 F 3d 138, 1998 US App lexis 23; Sassouni v. Olympic Airways 769 F Supp 
537, 1991 US dist lexis 10239; Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines 440 N.e.2d 1339, 1982 N.Y. Lexis 
3686; Rogers v. American Airlines 192 F Supp 2d 661, 2001 US distlexis 17541; Serrano v. American 
Airlines 2008 US dist lexis 40466; Nanki v. Continental Airlines 2010 US dist lexis 11879. Wolgel v. 
Mexicana Airlines 821 F 2d 422, 1987 US App lexis 8033; O’Callaghan v. ARM 2005 US dist lexis 
12889; Contrast Atia v. Delta Airlines 2010 US dist lexis 18806 and Okeke v. Norhtwest Airlines 
2010 US dist lexis 17607; Curran v. Aer Lingus 1982 US dist lexis 15937. Haley v. Air Canada, 1998, 
171 N.S.R. 289; 1998 Can lII 1140; Dick v. American Airlines 476 F Supp 2d 61, 2007 U.S. dist lexis 
19349; Martinez Hernandez v. Air France 545 F 2d 279, 1976 US App lexis 6147; Mac Donald v. Air 
Canada 439 F 2d 1402, 1971 US App lexis 11128; Donkor v. British Airways 62 F 2d 963, 1999 US 
dist lexis 12503; Stone v. Continental Airlines and John Doe 905 F Supp 821, 1995 US dist lexis 
17840; Rooney v. Coutts, Irish Times, May 2, 2008; Sulewski v. Federal Express 749 F Supp. 506, 
1990 US dist lexis 13925; Reed v. Wiser 555 F Supp 2d 1079, 1977 US App lexis 13660; Seagate v. 
Changi International (1997) 3 S.l.R. 1 at para.20; Kabbani v. ITS 805 F Supp 1033, 1992 US dist lexis 
15898; Waxman v Mexicana de Aviacion 13 F Supp. 2d 508, 1998 US dist lexis 10572; Sabena v. 
United Airlines 773 F Supp. 1117, 1991 US dist lexis 12023; Kabbani v. ITS 805 F Supp. 1033, 1992 
US dist lexis 15898; Croucher v. WFS 111 F Supp 2d 501, 2000 US dist lexis 13655; Waters v. Port 
Authority 158 F Supp. 2d 415, 2001 US dist lexis 11790; Hasserl v. Swiss Air 388 F Supp. 1238, 
1975 US dist lexis 13920 at 4; Krys v. Lufthansa 119 F 3d 1515, 1997 US App lexis 22644; 
Abramson v. JAl 739 F 2d 130, 1984 US App lexis 20346; Metz v. KLM 1979 US dist lexis 8375; 
Fischer v. Northwest Airlines 623 F Supp. 1064, 1985 US dist lexis 12846; Tandon v. United Air 
Lines; Walker v. Eastern Air Lines 775 F Supp. 111, 1991 US dist lexis 13402; Schroeder v. Lufthansa 
875 F 2d 613, 1989 US App lexis 7515; Jack v. TWA 820 F Supp 1218, 1993 US dist lexis 692 at 5; 
Husserl v. Swiss Air (husserl I) 351 F Supp. 702, 1972 US dist lexis 11294 at 5. Emery Air Freight v. 
Nerine Nurseries, 1997, 3 N.Z.l.R. 723; Vinotica v. Air New Zealand, 2004, d.C.R. 786; Ong v. 
Malaysian Airlines, 2008, hKCU 441; Paradis v. Ghana Airways 348 F Supp. 2d 106, 2004 US dist 
lexis 25238 at 6; Igwe v. Northwest Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 1204 at 6; Weiss v. El Al 433 F Supp 
2d 361, 2006 US dist lexis 32563 at 6; Knowlton v. American Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 6882 at 6; 
Schaefer-Condulmari v. US Airways 2009 US dist lexis 114723 at 5; Alvarez v. American Airlines 
1999 US dist lexis 13656, 2000 US dist lexis 1254; Carey v. United Airlines 255 F 3d 1044, 2001 US 
App lexis 14834; King v. American Airlines 284 F 3d 352, 2002 US App lexis 4611; Atia v. Delta Air 
Lines 2010 US dist lexis 18806 and Molefe v. KLM 602 F Supp 2d 485, 2008 US dist lexis 108910; 
Mbaba v. Air France 457 F 3d 496, 2006 US App lexis 18663. 
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2005, pp. 323ss; Wan Sung, 1995, pp. 121ss; Weigand, 2001, pp. 916ss)1. Without 
prejudice to the fact that it encompasses every bodily injury suffered by the 
passenger on board the aircraft or during embarkation and disembarkation 
operations, there are considerable doubts about the possibility of having the 
psychic damage returned to him. This is not linked to a bodily injury, while it 
seems permissible to believe that it includes psychic damage that is a direct 
consequence of a bodily injury. 
 
6. Carrier's Liability for the Loss or Damage of Luggage 
For air transports regulated by the Montreal Convention of 1999, carrier's liability 
for damage to checked baggage is presumed unless it proves that the damage 
results from a defect in the baggage itself. According to art. 17.2. for baggage not 
delivered, the carrier is liable if the damage results from his own fault or that of his 
                                                     
1See in argument: par. 45 of LuftVG Haftungfür Personenschiiden which is affirmed that: “(...) Wird 
ein Fluggast durch einen Unfal! an Bord eines Luftfahrzeugs oder beim Ein-oder Aussteigen getotet, 
korperlich verletzt oder gesundheitlich “geschiidigt, ist der Luftfrachtführer verpflichtet, den daraus 
entstehenden Schaden zu ersetzen it is generally accepted that passenger liability under § 45 LuftVG 
would be applied for the principle of § 253 BGB (...)”. The French Chamber appeal in case cFloyd 
has observed that: “(...) When the (Floyd) Court sought to examine whether French law in 1929 
allowed parties to recover for purely mental injuries, the Court limited the scope of French materials 
that it would consider as part of its analysis; the Court refused to rely on French judicial decisions that 
did not involve a mental injury caused by flight or shock (...)”. See also art. 124 of Chinese Civil 
Aviation Law of 2004: “(...) The Carrier shall be liable for the death or personal injury of a passenger, 
if the accident took place on board the civil aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking on or disembarking from the civil aircraft; provided that carrier is not liable if the death or 
injury resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation on 
Several Issues in the Application of Law Concerning the Trial of Cases about Reparation for Physical 
Injury (...) Where the claimant brings a suit ta require for compensation for property damage and 
mental in jury due to the infringement of rights ta life, health (…) the people s court should accept the 
suit (...) Where a tort results in mental in jury in which, however, non serious us consequences exist, 
and the plaintiff! demands compensation for mental in jury, the people's court, general/y, shall/ not 
favor such a claim. Alternatively, the people's court may order the defendant ta cease infringements, 
rehabilitate the reputation of the victim, eliminate the ill! effects, and extend of apology ta the 
plaintiff! Where a tort results in mental in jury and serious consequences, according to the 
requirement of the plaintiff!, the people 's court may order the defendant to pay the compensation for 
mental in jury, except ordering the defendant ta cease infringements, rehabilitate the reputation of the 
victim, eliminate the its effects, and extend of apology to the plaintiff (...) A person who is liable in 
compensation for damages in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article shall make 
compensation therefore even in respect of a non pecuniary damage, irrespective of whether such in 
jury was to the person, liberty or reputation of another or to his property rights (...)”. The Corean Civil 
Code in art. 751 declares that: “(...) A person who has injured the person, liberty (…) of another or 
has inflicted any mental anguish to another person shall be liable to make compensation for damages 
arising therefrom (...)”. 
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employees or supervisors. It would appear that the burden of proving the damage is 
borne by the passenger. It should be noted that the passenger can exercise the rights 
deriving from the transport contract if twenty-one days have passed from the date 
on which it should have arrived according to art. 17, par. 3. 
The content of the burden of proof is therefore expressly identified by art. 21.21. 
This provision, approved after serious disagreements in international negotiations, 
is very significant of the will of international legislator to definitively want to get 
rid of the institution of debt limitation for the damages to the person of passenger2. 
Maintaining the provision of the release evidence in terms originally expressed by 
the Warsaw Convention (art. 20) could have meant, the possibility of exposing 
carrier's liability system to “risks” of a possible rethinking of the jurisprudence 
regarding the effective content of the release document contemplated by art. 20 of 
the Warsaw Convention and related criteria. Preoccupation is not entirely 
unreasonable considering that the reasons for this jurisprudential orientation must 
be identified in the need to safeguard the primary interests of the transport user, 
such as safety, health and physical integrity, in the presence of limits absolutely 
inadequate monetary policies. 
Carrier's liability for delayed baggage transport is regulated in art. 19 where it is 
established that the carrier will not be liable for damages resulting from delay (Van 
Dam, 2011, pp. 260ss; Neligan, 2006, pp. 124ss) in the event that it proves that he 
                                                     
1The exclusive or concurrent fault of the injured party, which excludes the carrier's liability in the 
event that such fault has been the exclusive cause of the damage, while it limits it proportionally if it 
has been a contributing cause. Its effectiveness is undisputed in civil law systems, for which it is 
common ground that the causal contribution of the injured goes to reduce the damage items, while it 
raises some problems in common law systems, informed by the principle of the proxima cause, which 
postulates the integral responsibility of the subject to which the cause closest to the damage refers, 
even if it is only a contributing cause in competition with others; to avoid the assertion of the 
irrelevance of the causal contribution of the injured party with respect to the damage to be 
compensated, this provision was introduced and preserved in the uniform discipline. 
2Article. 21.2 of the new Convention, differently from the analogous provision of Regulation 2027/97 
(article 3.2), which limited itself to recalling the content of the evidentiary burden placed on the 
carrier by the original text of the art. 20 of the Warsaw Convention (adoption by the carrier and its 
employees of all the measures necessary to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to 
adopt), identifies two very rigorous exoneration hypotheses whose demonstration is required in terms 
of positivity: a) the proof that the damage that has actually occurred (such damage) was not due (was 
not two to) to negligence or other unlawful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; b) 
proof that the same damage was due exclusively (was solely due to) the negligence or other illicit 
omission of a third party. In both cases, obviously, the standard requires the identification of the cause 
of the damage by the carrier, with the consequence that damage from an unknown cause must 
necessarily fall on the carrier itself. 
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and his servants and agents have taken all the measures that could reasonably be 
taken to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to adopt. 
Liability for loss, damage or delay is limited to 1000 DSPs for each passenger, 
which is understood to refer to both checked and unchecked baggage (Sergeevna 
Kasatkina, 2015, pp. 96ss). Article 17.4 provides that if not otherwise specified, the 
term baggage has the meaning of both checked and unchecked baggage. The 
compensation limit will not be applied if the passenger proves that the damage is 
derived from intent or reckless and conscious conduct by the carrier or its 
employees or officers acting in the performance of their duties, or issues a special 
declaration of gratitude paying for possibly paying a fee supplement. In this case, 
the carrier must reimburse the damage up to the declared sum unless he proves that 
it is higher than the actual interest in the redelivery. 
In EU law according to art. 3 of (EC) Regulation n. 889/2002 it is established that 
EU air carrier responsibility in relation to passengers and their baggage is governed 
by the Montreal Convention. In the following art. 6, subparagraph 1, the 
Regulation specifies that all air carriers that sell air transport services in the 
Community must ensure that a summary of the main rules on liability for 
passengers and their luggage is made known to passengers at all points of sale, 
including sales by telephone and internet. According to subparagraph 2 it is 
established with specific reference to baggage that in addition to the 
aforementioned obligation to provide information, carriers must disclose in relation 
to the air transport services provided or purchased in the Community, the limit 
applicable for such flight to carrier's liability in the event of destruction, loss or 
damage to baggage and a warning that baggage of a value exceeding this amount 
must be declared to the airline at the time of legislation or be fully insured by the 
passenger before the flight. For the carrier a presumed responsibility for damages 
deriving from the failure to carry out the transport of the passenger or his baggage, 
a presumption that can be overcome by the proof, provided by the carrier that he 
and his employees and supervisors have taken all the necessary and possible 
measures, according to the normal diligence to avoid the damage or that it was 
impossible for them to adopt them. As previously indicated for the transport of 
baggage for which the carrier will be considered responsible for the same until the 
time of return the passenger including the period in which the baggage has been 
temporarily assigned to a ground assistance operator or to another auxiliary. 
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7. Compensation Limit of the Air Carrier 
The compensation was subject to a progressive substantial change which led to its 
exclusion due to injury to the person of the traveler in order to ensure adequate 
protection of goods and rights with primary value. When the compensation 
obligation of the carrier refers to personal injury, the highest good of life and 
physical integrity deserves a higher level of protection than that of the economic 
interests of the carrier. 
As regards the constitutive fact of the indemnifiable damage, the Montreal 
Convention speaks of an “accident”1 which occurred on the aircraft, or in the 
period of time between boarding and disembarking of the passenger. The formula 
used lends itself to the interpretative doubts that it had already aroused under the 
validity of the Warsaw system, referring therefore to the jurisprudential and 
doctrinal elaboration of the past (which in any case have never reached a uniform 
reading of the question), can be defined restrictively as “accident” anything beyond 
the normal, usual and expected performance of aircraft operations, also affirming 
carrier's liability for the harmful consequences of remedies prepared by the crew 
for inconveniences transport. 
The reading of the “lésion corporelle” is more problematic: if there is no doubt that 
it is desired elastic and therefore can follow the evolution of medical science, it is 
more difficult to expand it to include pure psychic damage. On the physical 
damages, nothing quaestio, as also, in the most recent also foreign jurisprudence, 
on the psycho-somatics; the problem of compensation refers to the mental injury in 
which the dichotomy of psychic damage is reflected between psychic damage 
resulting from physical injury and “autonomous psychic damage”, that is not 
consequent to a physical injury. In fact, if the psychic damage is causally related to 
the physical injury suffered by the passenger, nothing else would represent if not 
                                                     
1The etymology of the term accident contemplates the reference to an unusual event, which from the 
outside affects and damages the traveler. There does not seem to have to be another criterion of 
interpretation, such as the suddenness and unpredictability of the external occurrence to the passenger, 
elements that, otherwise, should be subject to probative burden on the part of the passenger and 
which, instead, more properly enter into the game of proof that the carrier is required to provide to 
exempt from liability pursuant to articles 20/21 of the Warsaw Convention, or 19 and following of the 
Montreal Convention. What is deemed indispensable for the applicability of uniform international 
legislation is that the accident occurs when the passenger is on board the aircraft or is engaged in 
embarking and disembarking operations; this is how the first paragraph of the art is expressed 17, 
which mentions the need that “the accident (...) took place on board the aircraft or in the course of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking”. 
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the dynamic moment of the same, the development over time of the biological 
damage. In the case of autonomous psychic damage, although we are dealing with 
undoubtedly unjust damage, we must try to bring it back into other damage claims 
elaborated by the jurisprudence, such as moral damage or the very new existential 
damage. Precisely in order to preserve the balance of interests, the contracting 
states have agreed that, in certain hypotheses-described in art. 22 of the 
Convention, and among which, in the transport of baggage, also the damage 
deriving from “destruction, loss, deterioration or delay” (Job, Odier, 2004, pp. 3ss; 
Dagtoglou, 1994, pp. 90ss; Kassim, Stevens, 2010; Kinga, 2013, pp. 404ss; 
Koning, 2008, pp. 320ss; Damar, 2011, pp. 306ss)-the carrier can benefit from a 
limitation of responsibility, and that, however, the existence of these limits must 
necessarily refer to the entirety of the damage suffered by each passenger in each 
different hypothesis, regardless of the nature itself of the damage caused to it. In 
the end, we can say that the figure of existential damage also testifies to the desire 
to extend the reconstruction of compensation if the injury to legal interest, or 
damage-event to the hypothesis of violation of other fundamental rights of the 
person constitutionally protected. 
Of the same orientation line is CJEU case C-63/09, Walz of 6 May 20101. It 
highlights that the provision of a limitation of compensation-in the mandatory 
hypotheses in which it operates-allows, at the same time, passengers to obtain 
easily and quickly the indemnity to which they are entitled, and the carriers not to 
have to bear any extremely burdensome compensation charges, as well as difficult 
to estimate and quantify, as well as potentially susceptible to compromising their 
economic activity. 
Beyond this problem, the abstractly compensable damage is patrimonial, biological 
and moral2, which can be compensated both to the passenger (who can transmit the 
                                                     
1ECLI:EU:C:2010:251, I-04239. 
2In reality, there is no sufficiently objective criterion for assessing moral damage. It requires a fair 
appreciation on the part of the judge of all the circumstances of the specific case to make the 
determination more subjectivising, provided that the liquidated amount is not merely symbolic. Often 
the judges resort to standard practices aimed at determining the moral damage on certain 
mathematical bases based in the case of personal injuries on the fraction of the amount paid as 
compensation for biological damage. The moral damage constitutes an injury to the moral integrity of 
the productive human person of a transient suffering and worthy of full and integral compensation. It 
is also a damage whose compensation requires personalization to the specificity of the specific case: 
ex if the judicial liquidation of a fraction as compensation for non-material damage is not illegitimate 
if the judge has taken into due consideration these peculiarities in order to reach however to an 
integral repair, only coincidentally coinciding with a fraction of the biological damage. 
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relative credits by inheritance) and to the next relatives who, by virtue of the claim, 
suffered an appreciable damage to assert its own jure. 
The Warsaw Convention has established according to art. 22 the limit to 125,000 
gold francs per passenger high from the subsequent Hague Protocol to 250,000 
gold francs with the specification that the amount of legal fees was added to this 
limit. The United States of America denounced the Warsaw Convention above all 
because they considered the compensation limit to be too modest and that it could 
not guarantee adequate protection for transport users. With the Montreal agreement 
of 4 May1966, with which the carriers voluntarily increased the limit to US 
$ 58,000, even if limited to flights departing from the arrival or stopover in the 
United States. Later, the 1971 Guatemalan Protocol, which never came into force, 
set the limit at 1,500,000 gold Poincarè francs, to which were added legal fees 
(KIM, 2003, pp. 10ss)1. 
                                                     
1The Legal Committee drafted, in its Draft Report, the key points of the revision: 1. Objective 
responsibility, even in the case of acts of war and sabotage; 2. Maximum amount quantified at US $ 
100,000; 3. Automatic adjustment of the ceiling of US $ 2,500 per year, for an initial period of twelve 
years, but with the possibility of intermediate revisions if deemed necessary; 4. Absolutely 
insurmountable limit in any case; 5. Possibility of granting the victory in the costs to the plaintiff, if 
the carrier had not promptly proposed to transit before the dispute began; 6. Acceptance of the so 
called fifth jurisdiction (plaintiff court); 7. For the damages caused by delay, it would have been 
answered according to presumed fault criteria, with ceilings to be drawn up during the diplomatic 
conference; 8. In any case, the carrier's right to take action against liable third parties (or jointly 
responsible) remained unaffected. The responsibility of the carrier was structured on objective and 
absolute bases, with an insurmountable limit, whatever the circumstances underlying the 
responsibility; a periodic update of the limit figure was also envisaged. Finally, in the definitive text 
of the Protocol the American requests for the creation of a “supplementary compensation scheme” 
and the possibility of referring to the plaintiff's court (so-called “fifth jurisdiction”) were accepted. 
Strict liability, an exception with respect to the traditional canon of liability for negligence (even if 
presumed), was already rooted in transport law (e.g. legislation at the end of the 19th century, Swiss 
and Prussian, on rail transport) and had already made its entry in the air transport of people thanks to 
the Montreal Agreement of 1966, but here, for the first time, a diplomatic conference sanctioned the 
overcoming of the rejection, for a long time perpetrated at international level, of the objective 
liability. In this regard it is referred to in the so called “Sunset of the dogma of the will” to justify such 
a radical change of direction: according to the doctrine that sustained this “sunset”, civil liability was 
to be seen as devoid of any sanctioning function, and solely in terms of compensation, according to 
the aforementioned theory of business risk, which shifted the damage to those who derived economic 
benefits from an activity (cuius commoda eius incommoda). The imputation of the damage itself, 
therefore, would no longer be based on the unlawfulness of the conduct of the carrier or its 
supervisors, but would have been linked to other criteria, thus proving that the civil liability had: “(...) 
a single purpose indefectible, that is that of the compensation of the damage (...) “, according to the 
doctrine it was gone toward a general system in which the imputation for fault would have been an 
exception in comparison to the rule of the objective liability. Also contributing to this orientation was 
the non-secondary observation that, in a technological context now so advanced, often no reproach 
could even be made against the injuring party, a moral requirement that was, instead, at the base of a 
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National currencies disbanded from gold in 1971 and this put the system of 
compensation limits set by the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol based on 
the gold standard into great crisis. The limit was excessively susceptible to 
oscillation and uncertain, forcing national judges to refer to the actual value of 
gold, rather than to a unit no longer linked to gold. The Protocols n. 1 and 2 of 
Montreal of 1975 fixed the limits set by the Warsaw system in special drawing 
rights, respectively, 8.300 and 16.600 for each passenger. With Protocol n. 3 not in 
force the limit was increased to 100,000 SDRs for each passenger while Protocol n. 
4, in force in Italy, left the limit fixed at the values established by the Hague 
protocol, that is to say 250,000 gold francs1. 
For example, Italy with the law of 26 March 1983, n. 84 replaced the Poincarè gold 
franc with DSP, setting the limit at 16.600 SDRs, i.e. the same amount established 
by the additional protocol no. 2 of Montreal thus giving rise to a significant 
lowering thereof. The carrier had to ensure its own civil liability for a ceiling of at 
least 100,000 SDRs with a suitable certified company according to art. 3, 2nd 
subparagraph. Certainly not a secondary effect of the pronunciation in question 
would have been to accentuate the possibilities of forum shopping. As a victim, 
assisted by a lawyer at least vaguely capable, he would not have chosen to convene 
the carrier if he could be, abstractly, forced to pay the entire damage, regardless of 
its quantification? But as just mentioned, if such an event was to be considered 
penalizing for Italian companies, but nothing more since this law had been set by 
the Italian legal system, the situation was different for foreign companies: not 
linked to the Italian state by anything else of the fact of making the connections 
there, they would have found themselves faced with the choice whether to accept 
the “Italy risk” or abandon the routes managed. 
The elimination of the limitation of air carrier's debt for personal injuries has seen 
                                                                                                                                       
sanctioning function of compensation, so as interpreted in systems of liability for fault. The 
requirement of guilt was defined as a “historical rudiment”, a fictitious moral criterion on which the 
choice had to be based between who, damaging or damaged, would ultimately have to bear the 
damage. If, therefore, no moral reproach could have been made against the acting subject, it would 
have been illogical to continue to maintain that the threat of liability could have dissuasive effects on 
the carrier, to the point of inducing him to behave even more diligently, especially if the acts 
performed by him also of a public utility nature, such as air transport, once blocked they would have 
brought more serious social damages to the community. Here, then, came to understand how the 
business risk theory, especially in fields such as aeronautics, could allow damage caused by legitimate 
acts in itself to be placed on the agent, who could have calculated the costs in the company's financial 
statements, through the stipulation of insurance coverage. 
1C-257/14, Corina van der Lans v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV of 17 September 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:618, published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
189 
the decisive moment in the aforementioned internationally renunciation limitation 
agreements according to IATA agreement of 1995 (IIA), Miami agreement (MIA) 
and ATA agreement (IPA). 
The principle of debt limitation has always been motivated by economic 
requirements, allowing the beneficiary to predetermine the risk to which his assets 
could be exposed in the hypothesis of ascertaining his responsibility in causing 
damage. But while in the maritime transport sector debt limitation was affirmed, at 
first, only in the transport of things, in the air transport, relying on the same mainly 
economic motivations, it also established itself in the transport of people. The 
intent was to devise tools capable of favoring the development of an industrial 
sector under development at the time of the signing of the Warsaw Convention. 
Previously similar requirements had led the uniform legislator to impose the 
limitation of the debt and therefore of the risk in the railway transport (I refer to the 
Berne Convention of 1890). 
In the sixties and seventies the air transport sector showed its propensity to identify 
a balanced composition of the interests of all those involved in the transport of 
people in the institution of objective liability accompanied by a potentially 
insurmountable debt limit. On the one hand the sphere of carrier's economic 
initiative was safeguarded by restricting the band of compensable damage within 
certain limits. On the other, there was an insistence on the need to protect the weak 
subject, the passenger, by setting socially adequate limits and accompanied by an 
objective criterion of responsibility imputation. 
The air transport sector has always expressed this natural tendency precisely in the 
proposal and discussion of the worldwide revision of the Warsaw Convention. 
Audit that has always been deemed to have to be carried out or with the 
introduction of forms of objective liability, with a corresponding increase in the 
extent of limitation towards values such as to guarantee the adequacy of the 
restaurant for the injured party, or with the preservation of liability for fault, 
although presumed, with the definitive abolition of debt limitation. 
The progressive intolerance towards forms of debt limitation in the air passenger 
transport sector, where the need to guarantee an adequate recovery of the prejudice 
caused to primary interests, such as physical integrity and health, appeared to be 
more intense and urgent, entailed the succession of numerous interventions of an 
integrative nature of the Warsaw Convention, both in the field of uniform law and 
in EU and national law. 
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For transports carried out by Community carriers, Regulation (EEC) no. 2027/97 
modified by Regulation (EC) n. 889/2002 which eliminated the compensation limit 
in the event of liability of the carrier for death or personal injury of the passenger 
even if an unjustified difference in treatment with respect to non-EU carriers 
ensued because the latter continued to enjoy the benefit with the sole obligation of 
expressly inform passengers of the non-application of the community rules on 
liability and compensation according to art. 6, par. 3 of the Regulation. 
1999 Montreal Convention that complies with Regulation (EC) n. 889/2002 has 
sanctioned with reference to international air transport the definitive abolition of 
the institution of the compensation limit. Instead, when it comes to damage caused 
by delay, the Montreal Convention maintains the operation of the limit on a par 
with what happens to damage to baggage, setting it at 4,150 SDRs. 
With the affirmation of the limitless liability of claims for accidents to the 
passenger the problem of conventional derogation of the limit and that of the 
forfeiture of the benefit for the carrier that in the past have dictated the attention of 
aeronautical law scholars and operators they have lost interest outside the specific 
subject of damages due to delay in the execution of the transport and baggage. 
The limit cannot be waived in favor of the carrier while it is in favor of the 
passenger according to art. 25 of the Montreal Convention. A further innovation 
was introduced by the Montreal Convention which consists of the provision of the 
possibility for the carrier in the absence of a specific obligation to refuse to 
conclude the transport contract with the passenger according to art. 27 in order to 
avoid incurring unlimited liability. 
The Montreal Convention provides for the possibility of forfeiture of the benefit of 
the limit exclusively for damage caused by delay in the transport of persons1 and 
                                                     
1In conclusion, in order to give legal relief to the delay and to make the liability of the air carrier 
pursuant to art. 19 Warsaw and Montreal Convention, it is necessary to carefully evaluate, firstly, the 
time indicated by the same for the transport in question, and secondly other elements such as the 
extension of the route, the means used, the amount of traffic or the existence of organizational 
problems caused by employee strikes. Only such an organic evaluation can allow the interpreter, or 
more frequently the judge, to overcome the gap in the uniform text deriving from the absence of a 
precise definition of the concept of delay mentioned in the art. 19. It has already been pointed out that 
the delay envisaged by art. 19 The Warsaw and Montreal Convention is the delay in air transport, and 
must therefore be referred peacefully to the time of arrival of the passenger, baggage or goods with 
respect to the time that can reasonably be “imposed” on a diligent carrier. It goes without saying that 
the moment of departure becomes important only for the fact that an anticipation of the embarkation 
with respect to the scheduled time must be necessarily avoided, for obvious reasons, but it must not 
be considered in relation to the concept of delay of which 19, if only because a delay in departure may 
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for the destruction, loss, deterioration or delay in the transport of luggage if proof 
of the derivation of the damage is provided from zones or omission of the carrier or 
of one of his supervisors committed with the intent to cause it or recklessly and in 
the knowledge that it would probably have resulted in damage. Consequently, it 
does not operate in the event of death or personal injury suffered by the passenger, 
as the limit no longer exists. 
The different orientation of the jurisprudence poses the problem to the objective or 
subjective criterion that must prevail in the evaluation of the courageous and 
conscious conduct of the carrier. The jurisprudential thesis that accepts the first 
criterion affirms the necessity of an evaluation according to the id quod plerumque 
accidit, that is the mere knowledge of the probable occurrence of the accident while 
another position that favors the second criterion supports the need to evaluate the 
actual knowledge of the probability of damage. In reality, the previous doctrine 
conformed according to this orientation, recognizing the difficulties inherent in 
evaluating vector's animus. 
The compensation limit applies in relation both to the action based on the 
contractual relationship between the passenger and carrier and to the action based 
on the concurrent non-contractual liability of the latter pursuant to art. 29 of the 
Montreal Convention and art. 24, par. of the Warsaw Convention as amended by 
Additional Protocol no. 4 of Montreal. The limit applies to the actions based on the 
non-contractual relationship between the passenger and carrier’s auxiliaries who 
acted in the performance of their duties according to art. 30 of the Montreal 
Convention and art. 25A of the Warsaw Convention introduced by the Hague 
Protocol. 
The system recalled of the compensation limit accepted by the Montreal 
Convention of 1999 is also applied within the EU by virtue of Regulation (EC) n. 
889/2002. The insurance obligation is reiterated, imposing on the airlines the total 
coverage of the compensation, with a slightly different formula from the previous 
one (we speak here of “adequate level” and no more than “reasonable limit”) which 
still leaves a, albeit lower that previously, margin of discretion. In the plot of 
attention that the Community legislator reserves for the protection of interests of 
individuals, the right that they have to fully know their rights and faculties could 
not fail to emerge, especially with reference to the liability of the air carrier; the 
                                                                                                                                       
well be recovered by the air carrier, especially in the cases in which the flight foresees intermediate 
stopovers. 
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right of passengers to information on the regime applied to the flight for which they 
purchased the ticket is expressly established, by any means1. 
 
8. Possibility of Psychic Damage 
If, on the one hand, it appears evident that the person of the traveler is struck not 
only in the case of death or strictly physical injuries. Also in the hypotheses in 
which an event outside it acts on his soul in order to bring him mental disorders, is 
also unquestionable that from a simple reading of art. 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, then substantially transposed into the analogous art. 17 of the 
Montreal Convention. The international air carrier would seem to be exempt from 
the damages deriving from a simple psychic trauma, that is from a mental shock 
not strictly connected to a physical injury. In favor of the exclusion of 
compensation for mental damage based on the literal data of art. 17 first and 
foremost, there would be considerations related to the need for protection of the 
aeronautical industry, particularly felt at the time of drawing up the Warsaw 
Convention, on the basis of which the legislator would have deliberately limited 
the indemnifiability of damages suffered by passengers to those of a physical 
nature. 
To support the limitation of the possibility of acting against the carrier for mental 
damages there would also be a normative datum, represented by art. VIII of 
Protocol n. 4 of Montreal of 1975, later merged into art. 29 of the Montreal 
Convention, pursuant to which, in the international carriage of passengers, baggage 
and cargo, any action for the purpose of compensation for “damages”, in whatever 
capacity it is founded, based on the Montreal Convention itself or a contract or 
unlawful act, can be exercised only according to the conditions and limits of 
responsibility provided for by the Convention itself. And, as far as some have 
observed that the notion of “damages” must be considered an index of a decoupling 
of the foundation of the action from the reply of articles 17, 18 and 19 of the 
Montreal Convention and the particular area of damage traced therein-and 
                                                     
1See the relevant EU legislation on tickets, in particular: Regulation (EC) n. 80/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, dated 14 January 2009, concerning a code of conduct for computerized 
reservation systems and repealing Regulation (EEC) no. 2299/89 of the Council (OJ L 35, 4.2.2009, 
pp. 47-55); the Regulation (EC) n. 1794/2006 of the Commission, of December 6th 2006, which 
establishes a common tariff system for air navigation services modified by Regulation (EU) n. 
1191/2010 of 06 January 2011. 
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therefore, with regard to art. 17, the bodily injury of the carrier-it is also quite clear 
that through the aforementioned rules the uniform legislator wanted to mark the 
area of indemnifiable damage events covered by the system of uniform law and 
then of the same provisions of Protocol n. 4 of 1975 and art. 29 of the Montreal 
Convention. 
Article 29, moreover, would have precisely the purpose of avoiding the exercise of 
damage actions in circumvention of the uniform international legislation through 
an action in tort, rather than in contract, that is founded on an alleged liability of 
the consumer rather than a contractual one. 
On the other hand, a possible extension of the area of compensation for damage to 
those of a purely mental nature would render meaningless the references made by 
the Montreal Convention to harmful events expressly “typed”, that is to say, as 
regards the first paragraph of art. 17, death and bodily injuries of the passenger, 
rather than personal or mental injuries. 
The opposite interpretation, on the other hand, is based on the finding that the 
failure to mention the mental damage in the provision in question could not, in 
itself, serve to exclude the compensation of the same, due to the fact that the 
Warsaw and Montreal Conventions do not they would claim to regulate any issue 
relating to air transport, but on the contrary to create a unitary system of rules on 
the matter. In essence, the fact that the psychological damage is not expressly 
mentioned by art. 17 of the indemnifiable damages, cannot, in itself, constitute a 
decisive element for the carrier to answer or not, and therefore the answer to this 
lacuna requires an accurate and scrupulous process of exegesis of the will of the 
uniform legislator. 
Regardless of the interpretation one wishes to assign to the literal data of art. 17, it 
is reasonable to believe that the Montreal Convention does not include an exclusive 
cause of action, in the sense that it should leave room for individual national laws 
regarding damage events that are not included among those explicitly mentioned 
by the same art. 17 as subject of uniform legislation. However, even in the 
hypothesis in which the possibility of acting for the compensation of damages of a 
mental nature must be admitted by resorting to national regulations (or, at least, to 
those that allow to exercise this faculty), it cannot be done unless the injury is 
detected which would be borne by air transport passengers if the causative event of 
only psychic damage were to be radically excluded from the scope of the Montreal 
Convention. 
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In light of this, one wonders-and the writer is definitely inclined to provide an 
affirmative answer to this question-whether it is possible and appropriate to 
interpret “in a broad sense” the text of art. 17 of the Montreal Convention (and 
already of Warsaw), in order to include in the bodily injuries also only 
psychological injuries, and this also in order to raise the uniformity of treatment of 
passenger damage, and at the same time avoid a fragmentation of the discipline of 
carrier liability. 
The “extensive” interpretation of the provision in question could also be endorsed 
by a significant historical consideration, inherent to the fact that, at the time of the 
drafting of the Warsaw Convention, the psychic traumas, among which, par 
excellence, are to be mentioned those linked to terrorist incidents, more frequent in 
recent decades they were not perceived as worthy of protection. This is an 
“evolutionary” solution, which aims to reconstruct the will that would probably 
have been expressed by the uniform legislator of 1929 if he could have known 
about the frequent and fearful terrorist episodes occurred in air transport in the 
following decades, and instead almost unknown at the time of the drafting of the 
Warsaw Convention. 
By adhering to this orientation it could be concluded that the provision of art. 17 of 
the Warsaw Convention includes any trauma, both physical and mental, occurring 
to the passenger during an international air transport or during embarkation and 
disembarkation operations. It is, however, a “sin” that the jurisprudence, especially 
the US, which has acted as a spokesman for the aforementioned interpretation of 
the uniform international law, has “debased” the same, considering that the claim 
for compensation for psychological damage must, however, be anchored to a 
national law provides a cause of action, that is, that recognizes the indemnifiability 
of the damages in question. 
If, however, the “extensive” interpretation based on the aforementioned historical 
reasons can undoubtedly be considered acceptable with regard to the Warsaw 
Convention, it cannot be denied that it appears difficult to sustain if the reference is 
the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Batra, 2003, pp. 20ss). 
In fact, the lack of consideration of psychic injuries in art. 17 of the Montreal 
Convention can no longer be ascribed, as some decades ago, to the failure to 
consider them as a possible consequence of air transport operations. The fact that 
the uniform legislator of 1999 has expressly contemplated only the death or bodily 
injuries of the passenger to trace the scope of application of the conventional text 
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could, therefore, apply to exclude from this sphere the productive events only of 
psychological trauma, the compensation of which would remain anchored-as has 
been pointed out above-to the particular national laws indicated by the conflict 
rules of the court having jurisdiction. In essence, only the alteration of one or more 
passenger organs could fall within the objective scope of application of the new 
uniform international regulation of air carrier liability. 
To confirm this assumption there would also be the consideration that in the first 
phase of Montreal Convention preparatory work, the editors did not take sides in 
favor of the absolute irreversibility of the damages resulting from the pure mental 
injury, but in a second at the time they decided to radically eliminate any reference 
to the reparation of such damages, as if to confirm the will to address the 
interpreter in a univocal determination of the meaning of the bodily injury 
expression, to be conducted according to the notions and rules of the lex fori, to 
which the Convention would leave the task of delimiting the compensation of 
harmful consequences. 
As far as has been explained up to now, it cannot be doubted that the problem of 
the compensation of psychological damages represents a question of a solution that 
is anything but easy, whose scope, moreover, has been amplified, so to speak, 
following the approval of EC Regulation 2002/889, amending the previous EC 
Regulation n. 2027/97, with which the uniform international law of Montreal has 
been extended, as regards the liability of the carrier towards the passengers, also to 
the transports carried out within member states. 
In the text of art. 6.2 of the aforementioned EC Regulation no. 2027/97, as 
reformed by the subsequent EC Regulation n. 889/2002, it is specified that the air 
carriers have the obligation to deliver to users of the community air transport 
services a “written indication” containing a series of information, among which is 
included “the applicable limit for such flights to the responsibility of the carrier in 
the event of death or injury”, without, however, specifying the type of injury to be 
referred to. 
The question therefore arises as to whether the concept of “injury” can also cover 
traumas of a psychic nature, also due to the fact that, as an annex to the Regulation 
in question, there is a warning that, in the matter of “compensation in the event of 
death or injury”, “there are no financial limits of liability in case of injury or death 
of the passenger”, and it would therefore be reasonable to infer that the reference is 
also to mental ones. It is understood, however, that this warning has no perceptive 
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value, and therefore even in the hypothesis that it must be considered that the same 
can authorize the request for compensation for damages only of a mental nature, it 
could not in any case be used as a basis for any claim for compensation. In the 
absence of this warning, there is no imperative value, the prescription addressed to 
the air carrier in art. 6.2 to communicate to passengers the compensation limits in 
the event of death or injury is not, in conclusion, sufficient to extend the provisions 
of art. 1 according to which the provisions of the Montreal Convention apply to the 
liability of Community air carriers. 
Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the original wording of Regulation no. 
2027/97, governing, in art. 3, the assumptions in which the liability of the air 
carrier is not subject to any financial limit, mentioned, in addition to “death” and 
“injuries”, the “personal” injuries suffered by passengers, thus leaving clearly the 
original intention of EU legislator to include psychic injuries among those subject 
to the liability system outlined there. 
In light of this, it could be argued that the text of the new regulation in question has 
even compromised the possibility of extending Community's air carriers’ 
responsibility, in application of Montreal Convention's provisions, also to the 
psychological damage suffered by passengers. Ultimately, the issue of whether or 
not compensation can be paid for psychic damage pursuant to art. 17 of the 
Montreal Convention is a topic that is still open and controversial, as well as being 
widely debated in international jurisprudence. If in favor of an “extensive” 
interpretation of art. 17 play of (sacrosanct) reasons of protection and guarantee of 
passengers, also inspired by the need to protect primary values such as the 
psychophysical integrity of the same, to the detriment of the same there are, at 
least, those related to the interpretation of the literal data of art. 17 of the 
Convention, which in the English version declares that only physical injuries 
(bodily injuries) can be compensated (Naboush, 2014). 
As is known, from the beginning of January 2010, the one drawn up in Italian, 
whose art. 17 states that the carrier is liable for damage resulting from death or 
“personal” injury suffered by the passenger. This expressive choice cannot be 
considered casual, and indeed should be considered as a clear indication of the 
recent awareness of the uniform legislator to include within the scope of 
application of the responsibility of the international air carrier also the injuries of 
passengers who have the nature of a simple psychic collision (Folliot, 1999, 409ss; 
Whalen, 2000, pp. 12ss). 
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9. The Competition of Non with the Contractual Action 
In the event that the damaging fact is unique, the problem arises of the concurrence 
of the contractual action with the non-contractual action that has occurred between 
the debtor of the transport obligation and damaged creditor as well as the Aquilian 
damage is a direct consequence of the breach of the obligation. If the subjects, 
actions and damaging facts were different each damage should be compensated 
autonomously according to the rules applicable to each one. It has been stated that 
the case in which the carrier-defaulting debtor causes at the same time both a 
contractual damage to his passenger-creditor and an extra-contractual damage to 
third parties outside the transport contract cannot be traced to the problem in 
question. 
It has been stated that if between the parties to the transport contract there is an 
obligation for which one of being (carrier) is required to monitor the physical 
integrity of the other (passenger) and to prevent the occurrence of damaging facts 
for this. The injury of the injured person's subjective situation is a consequence of 
the breach of this obligation, not of the violation of the general principle of 
neminem laedere sanctio. Moreover, when the carrier signs the transport contract 
with the passenger, he does not commit himself as previously highlighted only to 
transfer the latter to destination but also assumes the obligation to transfer it 
unharmed. If the passenger suffers an injury in its physical integrity in the presence 
of a pre-existing obligation, the special, contractual or legal rules that apply to it. In 
addition, the obligation to protect passenger's safety regardless of whether or not it 
governs a subsidiary or legal discipline is essential and is related to the extent of 
the duty of collaboration of the transported person assessed on the basis of his or 
her less limited movement capacity. In air transport, the carrier's obligation to 
protect the physical integrity of the traveler derives from having entered into the 
contract and more specifically for the obligation to perform its service in 
accordance with art. 1385c.c. represented by the transfer. On the other hand, it does 
not appear to be possible in view of passenger limited ability to move and the 
almost always deadly consequences of an air accident that the carrier does not also 
have the obligation to protect the safety of the passenger alongside the main 
passenger transfer destination. Otherwise there would be a violation not only of 
diligence in the professional species that must be used by the debtor in the 
fulfillment of his obligations. 
The question concerning the accumulation has been set for biological, moral, 
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psychic or existential damage consequent to non-fulfillment or delay in carrying 
out the transport in order to allow the passenger to act contractually to obtain 
compensation for damages deriving from delay or default and on an extra-
contractual basis to obtain compensation for damage to one's physical or mental 
health as a result of the former. 
The possibility was sustained for the injured party to obtain compensation for the 
damages in question through the exercise of the contractual action only. At present, 
the problem of admissibility of the competition between the two actions with 
regard to transports subjected to the uniform conventional legislation, appears to be 
devoid of concrete interest because, as previously stated, such legislation in art. 29 
has equalized the effects of the two actions. The Montreal Convention of 1999 
establishes that in the transport of passengers and baggage any compensation for 
damages, promoted for any reason under the Convention itself or on the basis of a 
contract or unlawful act or for any other cause can only be exercised under the 
conditions and within the limits of responsibility established by the same 
Convention. 
Also for the transports falling within the scope of application of the Community 
Regulation n. 2027 as amended by Regulation (EC) n. 889/2002 which doubt has 
been advanced about the possibility of resorting to the competition between 
contractual and extra-contractual action due to the recall operated by art. 3 of the 
Regulation last cited in the legislation on carrier liability for passengers and 
baggage of the Montreal Convention. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
Under the limit of debt is a choice in favor of one of the parties, traditionally the 
carrier, which his responsibility contained within precise limits, allowing it to 
quantify his risk and, in this way, to be able to ensure it, redistributing it on the 
credit market, which the insurer has access to. In the Convention of 1929, in fact, 
the primary objective was the protection of the potential of a nascent industry, 
which however had already shown that it could revolutionize the conception of 
long-distance transport. To affirm today that, with the Montreal Convention of 
1999 and the Community Regulations of 1997, 2002 and the following ones, the 
limit has disappeared also from the sphere of the transport of people seems not to 
be shared: in its metamorphosis, adaptation to the new sensibility and always more 
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sophisticated technologies, the institute has maintained its essence of distinction 
between two different imputation procedures of damage. In 1929 a subjective 
responsibility for presumed fault followed, a rectius could have followed, a 
criterion of redistribution of the damage based on intent and gross negligence. 
However, due to the difficulty of carrying out the proof required to obtain full 
compensation, the figure in question, gradually adapted, became a practically 
insuperable limit. In the Montreal Convention of 1999, the two-tier system does not 
present significant conceptual differences. It is still a threshold between an 
objective liability and a subjective one due to presumed fault. The substantial 
difference lies in the wide possibility of accessing even the highest level of 
compensation, proving its own damage. The carrier must prove that the cause of 
damage did not depend on its own negligence, or is attributable exclusively to the 
fact of the third party. If the structure of the vectorial responsibility, based on the 
tripod formed by imputation criterion, limit figure, insurance, is still almost the 
same, what is the novelty of the discipline to be sought for? This “essential tripod” 
is a neutral choice in itself, a tool that shapes itself on the contingent situation and 
on legislator's choices. In the pioneering phase of the flight it was essential to 
protect an infant industry from the disastrous consequences of fairly probable 
claims: the reasoning was linear, if the passenger chooses a vehicle that presents 
higher levels of risk than the others, he, buying the ticket, accepts these risks, not 
being able to complain in compensation for damages. Thus one saw in the 
passenger a kind of co-participant aware of the new industry, partially allowing it 
to bear even the negative consequences. 
The nature of a uniform international law instrument will allow, within the EU, to 
eliminate some inconveniences already highlighted by the critics in the 
commentary of Regulation 2027 (I refer in particular to the field of application of 
the Regulation represented by the category of Community air carriers, those with 
an operating license pursuant to Regulation (EEC) 2407/92). 
In general, we can affirm that for the air transport of people the entry into force of 
the Convention finally guarantees a substantial uniformity of the rules of 
responsibility. In fact, the feared risk of excessive, further fragmentation of the 
Warsaw system seems to be averted. Transportation as an international transport 
pursuant to art. 1 of the new Convention and other transports, to be intended as 
community transport, will be able to benefit from an almost identical liability 
regime. The differences, undoubtedly negligible compared to those existing today, 
may be eliminated in the review of Regulation n. 2027, already subject to the 
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revision of the Warsaw Convention by ICAO from recital n. 15 of the Regulation 
itself. 
In the end, we can say that in any case, even disregarding the future formalization 
in a continuous and evolutionary integration of air carrier's responsibility, an 
important and fundamental intervention must be recognized both internationally 
and EU. An intervention that sounds like a further confirmation of the need to 
intensify measures to protect the regime and support users of air transport, and it 
will certainly be worthwhile to favor solutions on the point for greater protection of 
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